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Abstract 
 
Despite media attention detailing labor abuses in fisheries, social-ecological 
systems research has largely failed to consider whether fish stock declines could be 
contributing to increases in forced labor slavery. Empirical fisheries data suggests, 
though not a ubiquitous response to declining stocks, many vessels will fish longer, 
farther from shore, and deeper in waters to maintain yields. This effort intensification 
increases production costs, and Brashares et al. (2014), consistent with slavery theory, 
posited cheap and/or unpaid labor as an approach to offset increasing costs and continue 
harvesting fish species at a rate otherwise cost-prohibitive. 
Using fuzzy cognitive mapping—a participatory, semi-quantitative systems 
modeling technique that uses participants’ knowledge to define complex system 
dynamics including fuzzy causality (causality represented as a matter of degree on a 
spectrum rather than certainty)—this study tested the hypothesis by interviewing 
stakeholders from global slavery hotspots. Data was obtained through semi-structured, 
qualitative interviews (n = 44) that included a cognitive mapping activity. An iterative, 
systematic, and inductive thematic content analysis condensed each map into major 
variables. Using structural models derived from graph theory, each cognitive map was 
converted into an adjacency matrix. From the matrix, influence metrics were calculated to 
elicit further information about each graph’s structure and group like maps. ANOVAs 
and independent sample t-tests to test for map structure differences across demographic 
 iii 
variables were statistically insignificant. As such, using vector-matrix operations, all 44 
maps were aggregated into one cumulative, consensus map. This consensus map was then 
used to refine the posited theory and execute case scenario analyses to assess the value of 
forced labor slavery changes in proposed case scenario simulations. 
Broadly, participants identified forced labor slavery as a distal outcome of marine 
fish stock declines, describing a process wherein declines intensify effort—increasing 
production costs. These increasing costs then incentivize the use of forced labor in 
response to narrowing profit margins, ultimately normalizing the use of forced labor as an 
economically rational decision. Case scenario analyses suggested if overfishing is not 
addressed, and marine stocks continue to decline, forced labor slavery in the fishing 
sector will continue to increase. Additionally, increases in forced labor slavery may 
increase stock declines. Proposed policy interventions to mitigate overfishing could 
reduce labor abuses in the sector. Therefore, the framework produced by the consensus 
map should guide more wide-scale, empirical testing of the relationship between fish 
stock declines and forced labor slavery and identify points-of-intervention for policy and 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Problem Statement 
Globally, vulnerable populations facing extreme poverty disproportionately 
depend on marine fish for food, nutrition, livelihood, and export earnings (Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], 2014, 2016a). Approximately 3.1 
billion people worldwide, or more than 40% of the world’s population, rely on seafood as 
their primary protein source, with oceanic fish accounting for more than 20% of protein 
consumption. However, in most small island developing states (SIDS) and coastal low-
income food-deficit countries (LIFDCs) (e.g., Bangladesh, Ghana, and Sierra Leone), 
marine fish species constitute more than 50% of dietary protein intake. In these poorer 
countries, more than 120 million impoverished persons also depend on marine capture 
fisheries for all or most of their income (FAO, 2014, 2016a). Approximately 90% of all 
small-scale1, marine capture fishers and more than two-thirds of all marine fishers 
worldwide live in developing countries’ coastal areas where few alternative livelihood 
activities exist (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
2015; World Bank, 2013). Additionally, developing countries export more than 50% of 
all global fish products, stimulating development through job and income generation 
(Bellmann, Tipping, & Sumaila, 2016; FAO, 2016a; Smith et al., 2010). The human 
                                               
1 See Appendix A for a list of terms commonly used to describe fisheries and vessels. 
2 
population is projected to reach 9.7 billion people by 2050, with the majority of this 
increase in developing countries with pre-existing high food insecurity rates, rendering 
fisheries essential for poverty alleviation and the achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs)in the developing world (United Nations [UN], 2017). 
Despite developing countries’ dependence on fish, anthropogenic pressures 
primarily perpetrated by industrialized nations (countries with developed economies and 
the social capacity to adapt to environmental hazards) have endangered approximately 
77% of marine fish stocks, with at least 30% of stocks classified beyond or near beyond 
ecological recovery (FAO, 2016a). These human-induced pressures include overfishing 
and wasteful bycatch2 and discard from extractive industries;3 pollution from coastal 
development; and ocean acidification and warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions 
(Halpern et al., 2008; World Wildlife Fund [WWF], 2015; Zeller, Cashion, Palomares, & 
Pauly, 2017). The resulting ecological impacts on fish stocks from these pressures 
include food web disruptions, anatomical and physiological changes, catastrophic 
population and abundance declines, and shifts in spatial and depth distribution (Jackson 
et al., 2001; Maureaud et al., 2017; Pauly & Cheung, 2017; Rijnsdorp, Peck, Engelhard, 
Möllmann, & Pinnegar, 2009). 
                                               
2 Bycatch is all unintended, non-targeted specimens harvested in a catch. This includes 
specimens that are the wrong species, sex, or age (i.e., a juvenile or undersized 
specimen).   
 
3 Marine extractive industries include various fishing methods, deep sea trawling wherein 
weighted nets are dragged along the sea bed, deep sea and seabed mining, and deep-water 
gas and oil drilling. 
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Slavery as a proposed social outcome of fish stock changes. While these 
ecological impairments are well understood and extensively documented, research on the 
social impact of fish stocks’ changes (specifically fewer and smaller fish with altered 
spatial distributions that result in reduced catches) has been limited to primarily proximal 
outcomes such as malnutrition (Golden et al., 2016). Changes the influence of fish stocks 
on more distal outcomes, such as social conflicts like forced labor slavery, is less 
understood and often unanalyzed.  
Defining modern forced labor slavery. 
For this study, forced labor slavery was defined as “the involuntary entry and 
holding of people at a workplace through force, fraud, or coercion for purposes of forced 
labor so that the slaveholder can extract profit” (Free the Slaves, 2017, para. 1), and was 
consistent with the author’s previous scholarly work on the subject matter (Decker Sparks 
& Hasche, 2018). The reasons for using this definition, espoused in Decker Sparks & 
Hasche (2018), and repeated here, include focusing the identification of labor abuses on 
the victims’ experiences versus legal frameworks which overemphasize the need for 
specific forms of movement across borders (Bales, 2017). Human trafficking, the more 
rhetorically popular term in scholarship, media, and the public, instead centers legal 
frameworks and is influenced by conflicting and inconsistent definitions that vary 
between governments and institutions (Bales, 2017). As a result, the term human 
trafficking is applied more narrowly, and likely under identifies the scope and scale of 
labor abuses on fishing vessels. 
The definition used in this study points to the nuanced differences between 
historical slavery and modern slavery, wherein slavery is still defined by the relationship 
4 
between victim and abuser (akin to an owner in historical slavery). However, over time, 
slavery has evolved from an owner-property relationship to a relationship where the 
victim receives little or no payment for their labor while the perpetrator’s profits increase 
(Bales, 2006). Other shifts include the transposition of unfreedoms, or when the victims’ 
freedom is restrained, from point of entry into the exploitative relationship (historical 
slavery) to the point of exit from the relationship (modern slavery) (Barrientos, Kothari, 
and Phillips, 2013; Phillips and Mieres, 2015; Stringer, Whittaker, & Simmons, 2016) 
and control of the victim at point of entry into the relationship being exerted by a person 
(historical slavery) to socio-economic conditions (modern) (O’Neill, 2011). Indeed, while 
some victimized fishers are still purchased by boat captains (Chantavanich, 
Laodumrongchai, and Stringer, 2016), many exhibit a degree of agency at point of entry 
caused by desperation to meet basic needs and exploited by brokers and/or recruiters’ 
deception (O’Neill, 2011). These subtle differences are important distinctions to 
encompass in a definition, as they challenge misconceptions about what constitutes 
slavery that lead to misunderstandings about the nature and extent of modern slavery. 
 Beyond the legal concept of human trafficking, some governments, international 
frameworks and protocols, and non-governmental organizations also make a distinction 
between non-sexually exploitive coercive labor practices such as forced labor, debt 
bondage, and bonded labor. Because these definitions can differ between inter and intra-
country based on laws, political structures, and cultural influences, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) defines any activity or process involving involuntary consent 
into an exploitative labor relationship and using the threat of or actual force, coercion, or 
punishment to remain in the exploitative relationship as forced labor exploitation, one of 
5 
the four types of modern slavery4 (Walk Free Foundation & International Labour 
Organization [ILO], 2017). Therefore, this definition is considered holistic enough to 
encompass all manifestations of forced labor slavery globally. The ILO’s authority is 
derived from the perception that it is a global governing body impervious to country or 
regional biases, and thus more objective in defining and identifying slavery. Indeed, 
within the human rights community, governments are often accused of minimizing 
slavery whereas NGOs are accused of inflating the problem (e.g., Kessler, 2015). 
Slavery in the fishing industry. 
The shift from historical to modern slavery as noted by Bales (2006), also 
challenges the legitimacy of slavery in the fishing industry as a problem. Because slavery 
is illegal in every country and most forced labor slavery victims are no longer sold in 
public venues, slavery is perceived as a historical relic, and therefore not a current or 
important problem. Also, unlike historical slavery, modern slavery is more fluid, where 
victims spend on average 20.5 months enslaved, instead of lifetimes, (ILO & Walk Free 
Foundation, 2017), further contributing to false beliefs and perceptions that slavery has 
been eradicated and is no longer a problem.  
Enslaved persons’ hidden nature, and the physical inaccessibility of fishing fleets 
sailing hundreds of miles from shore for years at a time have created a dearth of empirical 
research on the problem, making it difficult to quantify the problem and further 
contributing to hiding the problem from the public. Investigations suggest the fishing 
industry is one of the biggest users of forced labor slavery, with a conservative estimate 
                                               
4 Beyond forced labor exploitation, the other three types of modern slavery are forced 
sexual exploitation, state-imposed exploitation, and forced marriage. 
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of two million people enslaved in the fishing/agriculture sector (Walk Free Foundation & 
ILO, 2017), including on boats originating from the United States, Thailand, New 
Zealand, United Kingdom, Nicaragua, and Peru amongst others (Bales, 2016; Bureau of 
International Labor Affairs, 2016; Environmental Justice Foundation [EJF], 2014, 2015a; 
FishWise, 2014; ILO, 2013a; Mendoza, McDowell, Mason, & Htusan, 2016; United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2011; Verité, 2016; Yea, 2014). 
Additionally, of all the sector estimates for forced labor slavery, fishing is the most 
challenging in that victims in the middle of the ocean remain inaccessible and 
unaccounted for despite technological advances such as drones which have aided the 
counting of victims in other sectors. In 2017, out of concern that the problem is growing, 
INTERPOL even issued a notice alerting law enforcement about the presence of labor 
exploitation, human trafficking and slavery in the fishing industry (INTERPOL, 2017). 
From the little existing research, it is believed that most slavery victims in the 
fisheries sector are illiterate, impoverished, male domestic and transnational migrants 
(Bales, 2016; EJF, 2014; ILO, 2013a; International Organization for Migration [IOM], 
2008). Unable to read contracts, they are frequently tricked into debt bondage schemes by 
middlemen and employers who offer employment agreements that include debt 
repayment, advanced wages, equipment loans, and/or travel advances and documents for 
“higher paying” work in foreign countries in exchange for labor until the “debt” to the 
employer is satisfied. These schemes persist as employers continuously add new debts 
(e.g., for food and shelter) making repayment impossible, enslaving the laborer, and 
increasing the employer’s profits (Aghazarm & Laczko, 2008; Bales, 2006, 2007, 2012, 
2016; ILO, 2005; Chantavanich, Laodumrongchai, & Stringer, 2016; End Slavery Now, 
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2017; Ferolin & Dunaway, 2013; IOM, 2008; MacFarlane, 2015; Stringer et al., 2016; 
Wheaton et al., 2010; Yea, 2014). However, though debt bondage is the most common 
mechanism for victims to enter slavery, it is not the only one. A smaller number of 
victims have reported being kidnapped. Moreover, though slaves may board a vessel in 
their country of origin, they can be released from bondage and/or slavery without 
resources in countries anywhere in the world, making them vulnerable to enslavement on 
a ship in their new country and perpetuating a vicious cycle (Mendoza et al., 2016).  
Extensive changes in fish stock abundance, distribution, and individual specimen 
size (herein referred to as fish stock declines) force fishing vessels to fish longer, farther 
from shore, and in deeper waters to maintain yields (Brashares et al., 2014; UNODC, 
2011). This fishing intensification increases production costs and inflates cheap labor 
needs in response to narrowing profit margins (Bell, Watson, & Ye, 2016; Gascuel et al., 
2016; Hutchings & Myers, 1995; Watson et al., 2013).  Therefore, ecological drivers of 
forced labor slavery must be considered in conjunction with other known indicators, such 
as poverty (Bales, 2006, 2007), to efficaciously mitigate labor abuses on fishing vessels. 
Thus, this dissertation frames anthropogenic-induced fish stock declines and forced labor 
slavery as a coupled social-ecological problem within the context of Social-Ecological 
Systems theory (SES). SES postulates that social and ecological multilevel systems are 
nested, interactive, and interdependent, exhibiting complex feedback loops that result in 
disturbances in one system impacting all systems (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, 
2007, 2009, 2010). As a result, SES provides the theoretical rationale for linking two 
previously considered disparate systems. 
  
8 
Study Purpose and Specific Aims 
Data characterizing fish stock declines and forced labor slavery’s relationship 
does not yet exist and trans-disciplinary research is necessary to create efficacious, linked 
social-ecological interventions that balance ecological and human security. Fisheries 
management approaches have historically been reactive and siloed within biology, 
ignoring and potentially perpetuating human rights violations. To shift fisheries 
management towards preventive strategies inclusive of socially just outcomes, social 
work must aid in the production of trans-disciplinary knowledge exploring the linkages 
between fish stocks and labor conditions. 
Guided by an overarching research question, “What is the relationship between 
fish stock changes and forced labor slavery,” this exploratory study’s goal is to build a 
theoretical framework modeling marine fish stock declines and forced labor slavery as a 
social-ecological system using fuzzy logic cognitive mapping (FCM) to assess 
relationships and their strength between key constructs and variables. FCM is a 
participatory, semi-quantitative systems modeling technique that uses participants’ 
knowledge and experiences to define complex system dynamics, including fuzzy 
causality (causality represented as a matter of degree on a spectrum rather than certainty), 
and infer proposed interventions’ impacts on the system by executing case scenario 
analyses (Kosko, 1986; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). While several NGOs, including 
Environmental Justie Foundation (EJF) and FishWise have posited a relationship between 
fish stock declines and forced labor slavery, data quantifying the strength of the 
relationship and the processes that create the relationship are still lacking. 
9 
Based on the fishing farther, longer, and deeper premise supported by empirical 
fisheries data (see Bell et al., 2017; Costello et al., 2012; Pauly & Zeller, 2016; Watson et 
al., 2013; White et al., 2008) and human rights theory (see Brown, 2000; Crane, 2013; 
Domar, 1970), this author previously posited a framework (Figure 1) hypothesizing a 
negative association between fish stocks and forced labor slavery (Decker Sparks & 
Hasche, 2018). An adaptation of Brashares and colleagues’ (2014) Wildlife Decline and 
Social Conflict framework, the framework theorized the mechanisms, processes, 
outcomes, and contextual constructs linking the two problems (Decker Sparks & Hasche, 
2018). Revisions to the new framework from Brashares et al.’s (2014) original included 
improved integration of human rights theory with fisheries empirical data and a greater 



































Figure 1. Revised Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict Framework
Figure 1. Theoretical framework hypothesizing the pathways linking fish stock declines and 
increases in forced labor slavery and the contextual constructs influencing the proposed 
pathways (Decker Sparks & Hasche, 2017).
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Using the revised framework, and still hypothesizing a negative association, this 
study’s specific aims are to: (1) test the framework’s validity, and use participants’ 
knowledge to refine the framework’s social-ecological system’s components, 
organization, and interrelationships; (2) quantitatively characterize the relationship 
between fish stock declines and slavery using adjacency matrices; (3) identify constructs 
and variables that potentially mediate and/or moderate the relationship between fish 
stocks and forced labor slavery; and (4) explore how the system might react under a 
range of possible changes in stock abundance and fishing intensification due to proposed 
interventions.  
Dissertation Organization  
 This introductory chapter identifies and provides a context for the substantive 
topic under study, as well as an overview of the study’s purpose and aims. Chapter two 
provides a brief review of empirical and theoretical literature, from diverse disciplines, 
supporting the linking of these two historically disparate problems. A concise assessment 
of international policy gaps is also included. In chapters three and four, the study’s 
methods and results are presented in detail. The dissertation concludes with a discussion 
of key findings from the results and implications for future research as well as the 








Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Misconceptions and disagreement in public and academic arenas about what 
constitutes post-20th century slavery, coupled with the hidden nature of forced labor 
slavery victims and the physical inaccessibility of fishing fleets sailing hundreds of miles 
from shore have created a dearth of traditional research in the area. Recently, 
investigative journalism from the Associated Press augmented existing traditional 
research by providing first-hand testimony of the fishing industry’s numerous and 
extensive labor abuses, including slavery (Mendoza et al., 2016). The reporting’s scope 
was limited, though, focusing almost exclusively on the supply chain. As a result, still 
very little empirical research explores the drivers of slavery on fishing vessels and 
theoretical research on forced labor often fails to consider the complex linkages between 
social and ecological systems when conceptualizing slavery drivers. If the motivation for 
enslaving persons is profit maximization (Bales, 2006), then the mechanisms that inhibit 
profits must be assessed for their contributions to slavery. As such, Decker Sparks and 
Hasche (2018) posited Figure 1, delineating the potential economic mechanisms 
facilitating a relationship between fish stocks and labor conditions, and further 






Anthropogenic Pressures on Fish Stocks 
This study’s underlying premise is that human behavior is inducing changes in 
fish stock abundance, distribution, and individual specimen size, resulting in increasing 
pressures to human economic systems in the fishing sector. These anthropogenic threats 
include overfishing, coastal pollution, and ocean warming and acidification resulting 
from climate change. Though studies and conversations about these problems are 
typically siloed in the natural sciences, these pressures on marine ecosystems have dire 
social impacts on predominantly vulnerable populations, though they are 
disproportionately caused by industrialized societies, making this a social justice issue 
pertinent to fields like social work and social welfare research. 
 Overfishing. Since 1970, unsustainable global fishing has resulted in a 50% 
decrease in populations of fish species consumed by humans for food products (FAO, 
2014). Additionally, the percent of assessed marine commercial fish stocks classified as 
overexploited (near beyond ecological recovery) or depleted (beyond ecological 
recovery) increased from 10% to 31.4%, with the plausibility of recovery in some stocks 
(e.g., cod) questionable (FAO, 2016a). These classifications are based on the ecological 
theory of maximum sustainable yield (MSY), or the maximum number of fish that can be 
harvested from a stock in a period without impacting the stock’s ability to reproduce and 
maintain or replenish the stock’s population size over time (Fox, 1970; Schaefer, 1954). 
When fish extractions exceed MSY, the stock declines. The global fishing fleet, 
dominated by EU and US subsidized trawlers, harvests two to three times more fish than 
the ocean’s MSY (Sumaila et al., 2015; WWF, 2015). 
 
13 
Increased demand. Increased demand for fish drives overfishing. Since 1960, the 
annual per capita fish consumption in industrialized countries has continued to grow 
annually, reaching 26.8 kilograms in 2013 (FAO, 2016a). Demand in the United States, 
European Union countries, and China has surpassed the production capabilities of their 
coastal waters, resulting in these countries fishing more and more in the territorial waters 
of developing countries who lack the infrastructure to fully exploit (i.e., extract the 
maximum amount of fish without jeopardizing a stock’s sustainability) their fisheries 
(Pauly & Zeller, 2016). This continued demand growth in developed countries is 
predicated on a growing obsession with exotic fish products such as sushi, trade 
globalization, human population increases, and increasing scientific evidence of fish’s 
health benefits (FAO, 2014, 2016a WWF, 2015). During the same 53-year period, the 
annual per capita consumption in developing countries rose to 18.8 kilograms from 5.2 
kilograms, and in LIFDCs from 3.5 to 7.6 kilograms, while per capita consumption 
declined in some African countries (FAO, 2016a). While consumption in developing 
countries is also increasing, overall per capita consumption is still substantially inferior to 
developed countries. Though this consumption data is not differentiated by marine versus 
freshwater species, more than half of all fish consumed by humans for food is harvested 
from marine waters (FAO, 2014). 
Historical overfishing. Marine overfishing is also not a recent phenomenon. It 
has long been rooted in the freedom of the seas principle, a belief that (privileged) 
humans are entitled to harvest as much as they want from the shared ocean; therefore, 
marine fishing practices should not be subjected to regulation. While it is difficult to 
 
14 
reconstruct exhaustive historical accounts of fish harvests and extractions (in part, 
because fish decompose quickly and human consumption includes bones), 
paleontologists, archaeologists, and biologists have documented centuries of large marine 
vertebrate (e.g., whales) and small invertebrate (e.g., invertebrates with shells such as 
conchs) culls (Clapham & Baker, 2002; Jackson et al., 2001).  For example, in the 16th 
and 17th centuries the Basque extirpated entire whale populations in the Bay of Biscay, 
then began whaling farther into the sea. This behavior further decimated other North 
Atlantic whale populations that five hundred years later have yet to recover (McLeod et 
al., 2008), and likely impacted indigenous populations access to a subsistent natural 
resource. Scholars hypothesize that historical overfishing likely coincided with mass 
whale and invertebrate slaughters, and suggest three distinct periods of human impact on 
marine ecosystems: aboriginal, colonial, and global (Jackson et al., 2001).  
During the aboriginal period, while indigenous populations impacted marine 
ecosystems, most research suggests they fished sustainably and only for subsistence 
purposes until contact with White settlers (Bennett, 2007; Jackson et al., 2011; Nuttall et 
al., 2005). The colonial period, coinciding with colonization of indigenous populations, 
was characterized by mercantile powers’ systematic exploitation of marine species for 
financial and political gain (Jackson et al., 2001). And the current global period, starting 
approximately after World War II, is similar to the colonial period in that fishing and 
marine resource extraction is a strategy for usurping political power and economically 
oppressing marginalized populations. However, it is also now characterized by new 
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intensive extractive technologies that have increased the breadth and depth of 
unsustainable fishing (Jackson et al., 2001).  
In addition to the freedom of the seas principle, a belief that the ocean’s bounty 
was limitless permeated all three periods (including the global period until the late 
1990s/mid 2000s).  In 1883, at the London International Fisheries Exhibition, professor 
and biologist T. H. Huxley infamously stated, “all the great sea fisheries are 
inexhaustible; that is to say, that nothing we do seriously affects the number of the fish. 
And any attempt to regulate these fisheries seems to be useless” (as cited in North 
Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, 1909). By the 1940s, research suggested that 
unregulated fishing’s deleterious impacts included collapsing fish stocks just five decades 
after initial fishing; disruptions to food chains and natural predation that enabled non-
native fish and algae to flourish; and chemical imbalances that caused massive coral reef 
die-offs (Finley & Oreskes, 2013; Graham, 1943; Russell, 1942; Thompson, 1936). 
However, despite the growing evidence, overfishing was still widely considered 
unimaginable. Globally, fishing marine areas was still framed exclusively as a political 
and territorial issue. Further, the political resistance to regulation highlighted by Huxley 
was pervasive, ignoring overfishing’s environmental and social implications. 
Current overfishing challenges. Today, consensus about overfishing’s 
occurrence exists, despite divergent paradigms and approaches between fisheries 
managers and conservationists (Davies & Baum, 2012; Worm et al., 2009). Curbing 
overfishing; however, faces numerous challenges. Foremost, catch quotas are an 
imperfect, data-limited science, and most quotas are still based on the FAO fisheries 
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statistics database—the only longitudinal, global repository of reported catch and landing 
data (FAO, 2016b). While representing the best available, non-reconstructed or 
hypothetically modeled data, the FAO’s catch data is flawed. It is not adjusted for illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU), bycatch (i.e., the incidental harvesting of non-
targeted marine organisms during extraction activities), or discard (i.e., targeted species 
thrown overboard, often deceased, to harvest more profitable fish); excludes catches from 
small-scale and artisanal fisheries; and mostly relies on self-reported data from countries 
(Kelleher, 2005; Pauly & Zeller, 2016; Zeller, Cashion, Palomares, & Pauly, 2017). It is 
believed that numerous countries under report their catch data to cover up rampant IUU. 
Additionally, some countries also over report their catch data to exaggerate their coastal 
fisheries’ productivity and minimize overfishing-induced declines (Pauly & Zeller, 
2016). As a result, historical catch reconstructions have disagreed with FAO’s measures 
by as much as 50% (Pauly & Zeller, 2016). These potentially erroneous catch data points, 
are then part of the statistical calculations used to estimate abundance trends, which 
provide the foundation for establishing quotas; therefore, potentially contributing to 
“legal” overfishing. 
Further, more reliable data on fish stocks, particularly deep sea fish, obtained via 
scientific observations is difficult to obtain due to a lack of technological capacity. It is 
also time intensive and cost prohibitive (Devine, Baker, & Haedrich, 2006). As a result, 
less than 1% of all fish stocks have been assessed by scientists (Costello et al., 2012), and 
80% of global fish catch is harvested from unassessed stocks (Richard et al., 2011).  
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Consequently, many fisheries scientists interpret the available data as best case 
scenario and recognize in their interpretations that the situations may be more dire than 
presented. Within the scientific community, there is also a communal understanding of 
which ports and countries have reliable data (e.g., Norway) and which do not (e.g., 
Somalia) and thus require extrapolations of potential worst case scenarios that include 
adjusted models to account for potentially erroneous catch data. While the FAO data was 
used in this study, newer, more complex abundance models that have yet to be validated 
were also considered (Pauly & Zeller, 2016). And qualitative, ecological knowledge from 
stakeholders based on first-hand testimony from fishers about length of time to fish and 
catch sizes amongst other attributes of their fishing experiences was also integrated to 
assess for the extent of overfishing. 
Overfishing decreases abundance, causing fishers to fish longer, deeper, and 
father to maintain yields (UNODC, 2011), and it also impacts the evolution of phenotypic 
traits. For example, increasing fishing pressures in overfished stocks have decreased 
fecundity, reduced stock age, and delayed sexual maturation (Pandolfi, 2009). The 
decreased reproduction delays the stock’s ability to replenish itself when being fished, 
further threatening the stock’s population and abundance. Additionally, overfishing has 
decreased the overall size and quality of the fish, also causing fishers to fish deeper, 
farther, and longer to harvest larger fish that are more profitable in economic markets 




Ocean warming and acidification and coastal pollution. Modern overfishing is 
also compounded by other anthropogenic pressures that are impacting phenotypic traits, 
abundance, and fish stock distributions. Increased greenhouse gas emissions, which warm 
the ocean, increase acidification, and decrease oxygen levels, are reducing fish 
reproduction and growth rates and body weights (Cheung et al., 2012)—again resulting in 
less economically valuable fish that could cause fishers to increase fishing intensification 
to maximize profits. Warming temperatures have also caused notable distribution shifts in 
latitude and depth (Perry, Low, Ellis, & Reynolds, 2005), forcing fishers to fish further, 
deeper, and longer than previously. Some studies also suggest fish may not be able to 
evolve sufficiently to decreased oxygen levels, potentially causing mass die-offs that 
could affect population abundance (Cheung et al., 2012). 
Marine pollution also compounds overfishing’s effects on population abundance. 
Eutrophication (i.e., nitrogen enrichment) caused by chemical runoffs and fossil fuel 
burning associated with coastal development is increasing the number of dead zones in 
marine ecosystems (Diaz & Rosenberg, 2008). These zones lack enough oxygen to 
support fish species. If concentration thresholds are surpassed too quickly, it can again 
cause massive die-offs (lowering abundance), but even slower rates of eutrophication 
lead to notable distribution shifts that can intensify fishing efforts (Diaz & Rosenberg, 
2008). 
Theoretical Support for Linking Social-Ecological Systems  
 As previously described on page 7, social-ecological systems (SES) theory 
assumes human and non-human systems are nested and interconnected; therefore, 
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disturbances in one system have impacts across all systems (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014; 
Ostrom 2007, 2009). It integrates social and behavioral theories with ecological resilience 
theory and the ecosystem services framework in analyzing natural resource users’ 
decision-making processes (Berkes & Folke, 1998; Chan, Satterfield, & Goldstein, 2012; 
Cote & Nightingale, 2012; Rands et al., 2010). Ecological resilience theory posits that an 
ecosystem possesses an innate ability to self-organize to adapt to disturbances (Walker & 
Salt, 2006), and the ecosystem services framework accounts for the “benefits people 
obtain from ecosystems” (e.g., food, disease control, and nutrient cycling) (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005, p. 49). Beyond providing a theoretical foundation for 
linking traditionally disparate social and ecological problems, the theory’s goal is to 
prevent segregated knowledge accumulation in traditional disciplinary silos by 
integrating diverse knowledge sources, institutional structures and subsystems, and social 
behavior patterns at all levels (Ostrom 2009; Rands et al., 2010). By modeling how the 
social and ecological systems interface, practitioners determine how, when, and where to 
intervene in each system to ensure the equitable and just sustainment of both ecological 
resources and the human resources users. 
Critiques of SES theory. SES functions like a grand theory and is often criticized 
as too holistic, with abstract conceptualizations lacking the specificity needed to better 
understand highly contextualized problems (Binder et al., 2013; Hinkel, 2011; Mills, 
1959). While this non-specificity ensures the theory’s utility for a multitude of linked 
social-ecological problems, the abstract nature becomes problematic when researchers 
apply the framework to hypothesize coupled social-ecological problems whose linkages 
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have not yet been validated or to data limited systems. When critics suggest the 
framework’s ambiguity hinders its purported ability to detect and predict feedbacks and 
identify causation (Hinkel, 2011; Ostrom & Cox, 2010), they are likely making 
inaccurate generalizations from the SES framework’s applications to these hypothetically 
associated problems and systems. Without entering empirically supported models into the 
framework, SES is likely to “mask” deleterious uni- and bidirectional feedbacks and 
maladaptive responses (e.g., increased slavery) to resource unit disturbances (e.g., drastic 
declines in fish stocks) in favor of resilience thinking which assumes that systems (and 
users in the system) can inherently adapt to a shock (Hughes, Bellwood, Folke, Steneck, 
& Wilson, 2005, p. 383). The propensity to mask negative interaction outcomes results 
from the framework’s underlying assumptions about innate self-organization and 
consequent oversimplification and over consideration of emergent positive behaviors, 
while neglecting emergent negative behaviors. SES may also oversimplify social-
ecological problems by only accounting for uncertainty in ecological systems and not in 
human behavior, which perpetuates the framework’s positive emergence bias and limits 
its predictive accuracy in relation to resource users’ behaviors (Fulton, Smith, Smith, & 
Van Putten, 2011). 
Since slavery and fisheries are both data limited systems (Bentley, 2015; Guth, 
Anderson, Kinnard, & Tran, 2014), and research investigating a negative association 
between fish stocks and slavery is limited, an analysis of the problem using social-
ecological systems theory is not yet appropriate. Instead a more specific model that seeks 
empirical evidence to support the proposed relationship between fish stocks declines and 
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slavery increases, and develops a comprehensive understanding of slavery as a 
maladaptation to fish stock fluctuations, is needed. One such model is Brashares et al.’s 
(2014) Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict framework.  
Brashares’ Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict framework. While Decker 
Sparks and Hasche (2018) reviewed Brashares’ Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict 
Framework at length, the framework’s hypothesized pathways and empirical work from 
supporting scholars were included here to further inform the reader of their relevance for 
the dissertation. Brashares et al. (2014) postulated how and why fish stock declines could 
be a driver of increases in child slavery through an amalgamation of previously siloed 
empirical and theoretical disciplinary research (Figure 2). Building on the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) (2011) investigation that first speculated about 
the potential relationship between overfishing and human trafficking based on the 
presence of transnational criminal syndicates in illegal fishing rings, Brashares et al. 
(2014) proposed that fish stock declines increase fishing effort which subsequently 
increases costs.  Specifically declines force vessels to fish longer, farther from shore, and 
in deeper waters to maintain yields. The framework deduces that cheap or free labor is 
thus an economically justified approach to offset increasing costs and continue harvesting 
fish at a rate that would otherwise be cost-prohibitive (Brashares et al., 2014). 
 Despite providing a useful starting point for exploring the relationship between 
fish stock declines and forced labor slavery, Brashares et al.’s (2014) framework has 
several limitations. Foremost, without explanation, it focuses on child slavery as the 
outcome of fish stock declines. However, because these scholars failed to consider 
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differing cultural norms around child work, the outcome of interest they describe is more 
akin to modern forced labor slavery of adults. Additionally, their construct language does 
not consider the power differentials that incite these exploitative relationships, nor do 
they define their non-technical constructs (e.g., child slavery). They also fail to provide 
support for their pathways or consider several important variables from the human rights 
literature which have been identified as increasing fishers’ vulnerability to enslavement 
(e.g., transnational migration), since not all fishers are enslaved. As a result, Decker 




Figure 2. Brashares et al.’s (2014) Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict Framework
Figure 2. Brashares et al. (2014, p. 377) offer a hypothesized feedback loop linking fishery declines with 
exploitative labor practices such as child slavery. It is hypothesized here that as demand for cheap labor 
increase, more children will be enslaved.
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Revised Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict Framework 
 Decker Sparks and Hasche (2018) explicated in detail and analyzed the quality of 
empirical and theoretical support for Figure 1’s pathways. The primary tenets are 
described below.  
 Contextual constructs. As noted in Decker Sparks and Hasche (2018, p. 7), 
“While forced labor slavery is a global phenomenon, not all fishers are enslaved and 
context influences” the level of exploitation in a fisher and employer’s relationship. 
Derived from Bales’ (2006) and Crane’s (2013) theories on modern slavery, geographic, 
regulatory, cultural, and socioeconomic contexts “create an environment that not only 
accommodates, but enables slavery” (Decker Sparks & Hasche, 2018 p. 9). Their 
interaction with one another then essentially creates a slave labor supply, while the 
industry contexts “create[s] the demand for slave labor” congruent with supply and 
demand economics (Decker Sparks & Hasche, 2018, p. 9). In the revised framework 
(Figure 1), though some indicators for each contextual construct were included (e.g., rates 
of documented, undocumented, and irregular migration as a proxy for geographic context 
or low education and literacy for the socioeconomic context), these constructs were 
intentionally broad to allow for operationalizations that could be tailored to the unique 
context of individual countries and regions. 
Regulatory context. While there are numerous contextual constructs, the 
regulatory context may be the most important as the exploitation of a compilation of 
regularity gaps exacerbates the vulnerability of both the oceans and migrant fishers. 
Regulating the ocean (of which 64% is an open-access, common pool resource), and 
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transnational migration and fishing require multilateral, international legal agreements 
through the United Nations (UN). However, an analysis of power disparities within UN 
structures, using the six main organs leaders’ country of origin and country representation 
as proxies for power, demonstrated that large-economies or developed countries 
consistently vote in their own economic self-interests, usurp power and leadership 
positions, and subvert the interests of small-economy, low-income, developing countries 
(Decker Sparks & Sliva, 2018). As a result, most transnational issues are governed by: a) 
bi- or unilateral instruments, b) non-legally binding instruments (i.e., soft laws), or c) 
legally-binding instruments that are essentially a decentralized patchwork of 
unenforceable obligations covering specific sub-issues (in the interest of developed 
countries) of larger issues (in the interest of developing countries) (Decker Sparks & 
Sliva, 2018). Further, countries are only obligated to binding and non-binding regulations 
laid out in an instrument if they signed it, ratified it (often done through their own 
domestic legislative bodies), and then ascent to the treaty—becoming a party to it once it 
goes into force. Most UN multilateral treaties have a threshold for how many parties must 
ascent before the instrument becomes a binding or soft law, and this threshold varies for 
each instrument (UN, n.d.) 
As a result, the following regulatory gaps persist (Figure 3). Foremost, the ocean 
is governed by an international legally-binding document—the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Signed in 1982, UNCLOS has become 
obsolete (Decker Sparks & Sliva, 2018). While UNCLOS ascribed authority over 
territorial waters (marine waters within 200 miles of its shoreline), fishing on the high 
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seas (international waters beyond 200 miles from a coastal state’s shoreline), was 
essentially left unregulated to preserve the ‘freedom of fishing’ principle—the false belief 
that marine fish stocks are so abundant they could never be exhausted (UN, 1982, Part 
VII, Sect. 1, Art. 87, para. 1). Since then, more than a decade of negotiations for 
regulating fishing on the high seas have continuously been thwarted and stagnated by the 
lucrative commercial fishing interests of the United States, the European Union, and 
Russia (Decker Sparks & Sliva, 2018). On the other hand, low-income and developing 
countries lack the capacity to fish on the high seas, yet disproportionately incur the 
ramifications of the high seas stock declines (Teh et al., 2016; White & Costello, 2014).  
 
No legally binding, international instrument for transnational migration exists, 
resulting in the invisibility of irregular migrants left without protections or recourse—
further exacerbating their vulnerability. While documented migrant workers are afforded 
some protections under the UN’s (1990) Convention of the Rights of All Migrant 
• Temporary labor migrants 
(i.e., guest-workers)
• Highly skilled & business 
migrants
















Figure 3. Multilateral Regulatory Gaps
Figure 3. Venn diagram demonstrating that irregular (i.e., undocumented) fishers working on high seas vessels lack protections and rights under 




Workers and Members of Their Families, these are migrants who typically constitute 
guest workers and thus receive temporary authorization for migration and work in the 
destination country. These workers are also considered less vulnerable and typically have 
more economic security than irregular migrants attempting to cross borders out of 
economic desperation. Additionally, most of the countries that ratified the 1990 
convention were origin countries and not host countries (ILO, 2003). Thus, the lack of an 
international, legally-binding instrument for migration results in lower-income, 
developing countries hosting a disproportionate number of irregular migrants while 
wealthier countries like the United States and European Union member states select 
migrants of their choosing and increase their border security to block the immigration of 
migrants perceived as less desirable (IOM, 2017). 
Similarly, while seafarers and transport workers (crew on non-fishing vessels) on 
the high seas are protected under the ILO’s various international labor standards 
protocols, all consolidated under the ILO’s 2006 Maritime Labour Convention, fishers 
are specifically excluded and therefore have no labor protections when working in 
international waters (ILO, 2013b). As a result, in 2007 the ILO Work in Fishing 
Convention was signed; however, it just received enough in-country ratifications to enter 
into force on November 16th, 2017 (ten years after its signing). Further, it has only been 
ratified by 10 countries (Angola, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo, Estonia, 
France, Lithuania, Morocco, Norway, South Africa), meaning only these 10 countries are 
bound by its regulations (ILO, 2017). UNCLOS’ article 99, which is one sentence in 
length, does prohibit the transport of slaves for trade on vessels traversing the high seas 
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(UN, 1982). However, its language was never altered from the first UNCLOS in 1956, it 
does not define what constitutes a slave, and its typical interpretation is more congruent 
with historical slavery than modern forced labor slavery (e.g., UN, 2005). 
Moreover, fishers lack rights and protections in most territorial waters as well. 
The practice of ‘flags of convenience’ allows vessel owners to flag or register their ship 
in any country they choose, and not necessarily where their boat is from or where their 
boat is fishing (Dieter, 2014). It is estimated that 73% of the world’s fishing fleet flies a 
flag or multiple flags of convenience (Braestrup, Neuman, & Gold, 2016). Per UNCLOS, 
the flag state then has “exclusive jurisdiction” over the vessel, no matter where the vessel 
is fishing (UN, 1982). Consequently, many owners flag their vessels to countries whose 
regulations, monitoring, and enforcement are perceived as subpar or lax, or will change 
their flag while at sea to evade regulation wherever they are fishing.  
Flag state jurisdiction intersects with fishers’ labor rights because if a fisher is on 
a vessel flagged to Indonesia, but fishing in South Africa’s territorial waters near 
Capetown, they are not protected by South Africa’s labor laws. They would instead be 
subject to Indonesia’s laws, but Indonesia lacks the capacity to monitor or enforce labor 
regulations on a vessel in South Africa. South Africa could and should report the vessel 
to Indonesian authorities, but only the flag state is responsible for penalty imposition 
(Dieter, 2014). Currently, New Zealand is the only country in the world that requires 
vessels fishing in their territorial waters to reflag or register with them so that fishers are 
protected by New Zealand’s labor laws while fishing in New Zealand waters (New 
Zealand Parliament, 2016). Flag state jurisdiction also obscures which country has the 
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right or authority to prosecute identified slaveholders when human rights violations, 
which are criminalized under a legally-binding international treaty, are discovered—
resulting in most vessel owners caught using forced labor incurring little more than a 
monetary fine.  
Empirically supported pathways. As noted in expanded detail in Decker Sparks 
and Hasche (2018), empirical analyses of longitudinal, global fish stock data support 
Figure 1’s pathways from fish stock declines to decreased profits (Figure 4). When fish 
stocks decline, as previously noted, so too do catches (Pauly & Zeller, 2016). However, 
instead of reducing effort to minimize losses, fishing effort is increased to maintain yields 
to meet subsistence needs and consumer demand (Bell et al., 2016; Watson et al., 2013). 
This increased effort increases fishing costs, decreasing already narrow profit margins 
(White et al., 2008) and increasing reliance on foreign subsidies to prop up the sector 
(Gjerde et al., 2013). 
Theoretically supported pathways. Empirical studies of fisheries behavior have 
repeatedly found that fishing is a profit-driven industry continuously seeking to maximize 
economic gains by reducing input costs (Sethi et al., 2010). Therefore, based on the 1970 
Domar Serfdom Model, the combination of profit motivation, lack of ownership over 
non-labor production means, and high labor intensity within the industry results in the 
reduction of labor costs being one of the only options for reducing cost inputs. Therefore, 
as highlighted in Figure 4, decreasing profits increase the demand for cheap labor 





Moreover, Crane’s (2013) Theory of Modern Slavery supports increases in forced 
labor exploitation (i.e., slavery) as a product of increased demand for cheap labor within 
capitalist societies, where labor management is an entrenched value. Because of these 
entrenched values and the lack of other production inputs to reduce costs, forced labor 
becomes legitimized as an economically rational decision—making the use of forced 
labor not only plausible, but a likely response to the decreased profit margins incurred 
from increased effort amidst stock declines (Figure 5). And, since the cost of acquiring a 
slave has decreased substantially to an average of $90 USD per person and as little as $7 
USD for refugees (K. Bales, personal communication, October 6, 2017), modern slavery 
is surprisingly inexpensive to enter. Then coercion and deception maintain the 


































Figure 4. Empirically Supported Pathways in the Revised Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict Framework






increasing the slaveholder’s profits. Per Bales (2006), it is when labor exploitation leads 
to increased profits, that slavery exists. 
According to Bales’ (2016) Ecocide theory, once profits have increased, there is 
no incentive for slaveholders to cease using forced labor. Instead, they will continue to 
try to maximize their profits by using as much forced labor as they can acquire to harvest 
as much fish as possible, thus increasing fishing effort and further overfishing stocks 
(Figure 5). Indeed, it is believed the use of slave labor on fishing vessels contributes to 
IUU fishing, a major driver of overfishing and fish stock declines (EJF, 2015b; Global 
Ocean Commission, 2013). Per the theory, as long as a steady supply of slave labor exists 
(which is created by the contextual constructs previously noted), and the demand for fish 



































Figure 5. Theoretically Supported Pathways in the Revised Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict Framework
Figure 5. Highlighted are pathways in the framework supported by human rights theory. While a data limited





While data characterizing fish stock declines and slavery’s relationship does not 
yet exist, Decker Sparks and Hasche’s (2018) revised Wildlife Decline and Social 
Conflict framework can be used to direct empirical testing. Research advancing the 
framework is necessary to create efficacious ecological and social interventions and shift 
the social-ecological systems field from reactive, crisis management strategies to 
preventive ecological and anti-slavery strategies—particularly if fish stock declines are 
demonstrated to predict a substantial enough amount of slavery prevalence to be 
considered a root cause or driver. 
Thus, this dissertation’s boundary breaking and reformulating hypothesis 
challenged the boundaries of singular disciplines by linking two critical, yet historically, 
disparate issues. It is imperative for both natural and social scientists to consider these 
linkages as social-ecological conflicts inhibit equitable development and threaten 
vulnerable populations’ security. Besides the continued framing of marine fish stock 
declines as primarily an environmental and political issue, the historical disciplinary 
boundaries that considered the social and natural sciences discordant also perpetuated the 
lack of consideration of fish stock declines’ social impacts, including slavery. 
By conducting this study, the author integrated social work knowledge, methods, 
and values to ensure that social outcomes and mitigating marginalization, oppression, and 
injustices are at the forefront of environmental interventions. Social work scholars have 
produced limited research about the connections between social injustices and 
unsustainable natural resources use, in spite of declarations by the International 
Federation of Social Workers, the International Association of Schools of Social Work, 
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and the International Council on Social Welfare (2012) that environmental sustainability 
and human trafficking and slavery are prioritized objectives for the discipline. In 
addition, social work scholars are being called to develop evidence to address these 
social-environmental inequities by the American Academy of Social Work & Social 
Welfare’s 12 Grand Challenges for Social Work, one of which calls for a global agenda 
to “create social responses to a changing environment” (Kemp & Palinkas, 2015, p. 1). 
This paucity of knowledge threatens global equity. Instead, linking fish stock declines 
and slavery (previously disparate areas) can potentially generate greater consideration of 
relational power differentials between countries underlying overfishing practices and the 









Chapter Three: Methodology 
Methodological Orientation and Theory 
This dissertation aimed to answer the research question, what is the relationship 
between fish stock changes and forced labor slavery, through a fuzzy logic cognitive 
mapping (FCM) methodological approach. The following aims were addressed in a step-
wise process: (1) test the framework’s validity, and use participants’ knowledge to refine 
the framework’s social-ecological system components, organization, and 
interrelationships; (2) quantitatively characterize the relationship between fish stock 
declines and slavery using adjacency matrices; (3) identify constructs and variables that 
potentially mediate and/or moderate the relationship between fish stocks and forced labor 
slavery; and (4) explore how the system might react under a range of possible changes in 
stock abundance and fishing intensification due to proposed interventions.  
Though underused in social work research, historically, a variety of disciplines 
have used FCM as a theoretical and research approach, including engineering and the 
computer, social, behavioral, and political sciences (Papageorgiou & Salmeron, 2012). 
However, in the past decade, its popularity as a research tool to model complex and 
interrelated social-ecological systems has increased (see Devisscher, Boyd, & Malhi, 
2016; Gray, Chan, Clark, & Jordan, 2012; Hobbs et al., 2002; Berkes & Berkes, 2009; 
Kok, 2009). Within social-ecological systems research, experts have primarily used FCM 
to understand local communities’ decision-making processes including stakeholder 
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perceptions of social-ecological issues (Gray et al., 2014); compliance with natural 
resource management policies (Nyaki, Gray, Lepczyk, Skibins, & Rentsch, 2014); 
adoption of conservation interventions (Halbrendt et al., 2014); and adaptation strategies 
to perceived environmental risks (Henly-Shepard, Gray, & Cox, 2015).  
FCM was selected for its known capacity to produce fuzzy causal theories in data 
and knowledge-limited areas where robust quantitative data would be expensive or near 
impossible to collect, but historically unrecognized stakeholder knowledge is extensive 
and available (Glykas, 2010; Kosko, 1986; Reckien, 2014). Within the field of modern 
slavery, a historical lack of transparency and cooperation between NGOs and academia 
has resulted in substantial, previously unconsidered and untapped stakeholder knowledge 
(Bales, 2017). 
Prior research suggests FCM is particularly useful in building and refining theory, 
distinguishing drivers, and identifying linkages between social and ecological phenomena 
previously considered disparate (Fiss, 2011; Halbrendt et al., 2014). As such, FCM has 
often been described as the default methodology for hypotheses that are ideal for 
structural equation modeling (SEM), but lack empirical data for confirmatory model 
testing (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). Similar to SEM, FCM’s foci is the entire model rather 
than isolating individual pathways (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000), and its strengths 
include its ability to accommodate uncertainty created by insufficient data, abstract 
variables, feedback loops, and varied knowledge sources (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004).  
Approaching theory building comparably to grounded theory methodologies, 
FCM emphasizes the participant’s construction of knowledge (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). 
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Unlike grounded theory, it is hypothesis driven, uses participant knowledge to confirm 
expert developed premises, and uses a more positivist approach to data analysis by 
quantifying qualitative data to make inferences (Bendassolli, 2013; Charmaz, 1990, 2014; 
Kennedy & Lingard, 2006).  On the other hand, the validated fuzzy causal algebraic 
algorithms that underpin FCM’s data quantification are considered a less positivist 
approach to causality more accepted by the social sciences (Glykas, 2010; Kosko, 1986). 
As a result, FCM balances the philosophical tensions about rigor and limitations that 
often exist between the social and natural sciences and hinder social-ecological systems 
research by integrating research methodologies from both the natural and social sciences. 
Thus, FCM was selected over purely qualitative methods. 
 FCM uses directed graph theory to integrate fuzzy logic, cognitive mapping, and 
neural networks (i.e., interconnected, nonlinear, dynamic processes). In FCM’s first 
phase participants construct models from cognitive maps based on their knowledge, 
experiences, and observations. Guided by a research question, the researcher bounds the 
system and facilitates a dialogue where participants define the system’s most relevant 
variables and the dynamic (i.e., stock and flow) cause-linkage-effect relationships 
between variables (Gray et al., 2014). Data to construct the model is typically obtained 
through (1) questionnaires and surveys; (2) content analyses of written texts including 
literature; (3) empirical data demonstrating causal relationships; (4) qualitative 
interviews; or (5) a combination of the aforementioned strategies (Özesmi & Özesmi, 
2004). Participants analyze within-map data using directed content analysis, which 
permits conclusions about the degree, strength, and direction of relationships between 
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variables (Gray et al., 2014). These within-map analyses are characterized as directed 
since the researcher’s hypothesis guided interview question development, which 
influences participants’ variable identification (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  
In the second phase, maps are quantified by the researcher using fuzzy graph 
structure theory, which employs adjacency matrices and specifically edge and partial 
edge connection calculations to produce a quantifiable, fuzzy causality (Glykas, 2010; 
Kosko, 1986). Once all maps are individually quantified, they are aggregated using a 
mean approach that averages values for common components and corresponding causal 
descriptions and dynamics (based on directed graph theory) to produce a singular social 
cognitive, consensus map that reflects the collective sample, explained in more detail on 
pages 62-63 (Glykas, 2010; Henly-Shepard et al., 2015; Kosko, 1986; Papageorgiou & 
Salmeron, 2012). Lastly, in the third phase, the converged consensus map is then used to 
establish the system’s equilibrium and test “what if” case scenarios to identify the most 
efficacious interventions (Gray et al., 2014; Kosko, 1986; Nyaki et al., 2014). 
Study Population 
The study population was staff of anti-slavery non-government organizations 
(NGOs) working in the fishing sector, and staff from environmental justice and 
migration/immigration NGOs focusing on labor abuses in the fishing industry. Agency 
staff were selected over fishers as the study population, though many agency staff were 
former fishers, to minimize risk to participants and the researcher and maximize 
feasibility of engaging key stakeholders. Additionally, most fishers experiencing forced 
labor slavery are hidden and inaccessible to research staff as they are detained on fishing 
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vessels and not permitted to come ashore at landing sites (EJF 2014, 2015a; Fishwise 
2014; ILO, 2013a; Mendoza et al., 2016). Therefore, it is highly unlikely that these 
individuals could be recruited to a sample without the researcher boarding fishing 
vessels. And when contacted by researchers who have boarded vessels, fishers are still 
hesitant and unlikely to disclose abuse out of fear of losing what they perceived as one of 
their only employment opportunities (Stringer & Simmons, n.d.). Further, due to these 
accessibility limitations, a precedent exists in modern slavery research for using 
stakeholder knowledge to generate estimations of the extent of the problem as well as an 
understanding of the problem’s scope and nature (Bales, 2017). 
Study Setting 
Due to the limited number of NGOs working in this area globally, it was 
necessary to sample from NGOs worldwide, rather than a specific region or country, to 
achieve theoretical saturation for the methodology. Therefore, participants work in 
countries ranging from southeast Asia to western Africa, North America and the Pacific 
Islands/Oceania (see Table 1 on page 43 for inclusion of focus region in participant 
demographics). Noticeably absent in the sample, despite targeted recruiting efforts, were 
participants who worked exclusively in South America and participants from larger, 
international NGOs. Despite the more global approach to the study’s setting, countries 
that had NGOs with active anti-forced labor slavery programs in the fisheries sector were 
comparable in terms of the contextual constructs posited in Figure 1 that resulted in the 
country either being an origin or destination country for victims. That is, each of these 
countries exhibited high densities of migrant laborers in the fishing sector; limited and/or 
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corrupt regulatory environments; racial/ethnic/tribal stratification; and socioeconomic 
inequalities (e.g., income, access to credit, and education) creating high risk for the use of 
forced labor slavery in the fishing and agricultural sectors (Walk Free Foundation, 2016). 
Participants from New Zealand and Sweden were also purposefully recruited for negative 
case analyses to further explore the role of contextual factors. New Zealand Parliament’s 
(2016) new fishing regulations, put into effect on May 1, 2016, under the 2014 Fisheries 
(Foreign Charter Vessels and Other Matters) Amendment Act are characterized as the 
most stringent globally and Sweden’s fishers have one of the highest ranking socio-
economic profile globally (T. Harré, personal communication, July 5, 2017). 
Positionality Statement 
 As a doctoral candidate, of United States nationality, conducting global 
qualitative research, the impacts of positionality on data collection and data analysis were 
considered throughout the research process. Foremost, my own positivist orientation led 
to methodological selections and research design, most notably selecting a FCM 
approach over grounded theory and selecting fish stocks and labor conditions as the 
boundary variables in the mapping activity (discussed further in “Interview and mapping 
procedures”). Additionally, my hypothesis (which demonstrated my positivist core 
beliefs that: a) fish stocks are indeed declining, and b) fish stocks and forced labor 
slavery are related) was based on a critical review of empirical and theoretical literature 
from the fisheries sciences and human rights sector. Whereas the study’s participants had 
first-hand knowledge about the experiences of fishers with both fish stock declines and 
labor conditions. Related, as I previously practiced in a different sector of social work, 
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my years of experience working in the field of socially responsible fisheries was 
substantially lower than most participants. As a result, the use of a participatory, 
qualitative method was intended to center the participants’ knowledge. 
 While the knowledge imbalance favored participants, as the researcher, and being 
an American citizen, I still possessed power in the short-term interactions and 
relationships with participants. Notably, socially responsible fisheries research almost 
always originates in the fisheries sector; is often hyper-focused on southeast Asian 
countries or low-income, developing African countries; and the prevailing narrative 
frequently blames these low-income and developing countries while ignoring the 
existence of the problem or the role of western countries in perpetuating the problem. 
Additionally, this study was conducted between October 2017 and January 2018, in a 
political era of creeping economic nationalism and isolationism within developed 
countries globally. Consequently, and justifiably, substantial distrust existed between 
many participants and myself that led to participants requesting to not be audio recorded. 
To mitigate this distrust, I identified myself as a social work researcher who studies 
social-ecological systems, emphasizing the social aspects. I also purposefully recruited 
participants from the United States and throughout this dissertation attempted to elucidate 
the disproportionate role of western, industrialized countries’ power and privilege in 
inducing fish stock declines. 
Participant Selection 
 Sampling. The study used a non-probability, purposeful sampling frame. 
Inclusion criteria were as follows. Participants must have had direct contact or 
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interactions with fishers, be aged 18 years or older, English speaking, and affiliated with 
a NGO registered with the home country’s government. For example, if the organization 
was based in the United States, the organization must be registered as a 501(c)(3) with 
the United States government. This specific criterion was intended to reduce risks to 
participants. If the NGO was registered with the government, the government was already 
aware of the work the organization and its staff were engaged in, versus “underground” 
organizations that were assisting victims without the government’s knowledge— most 
likely because the government did not support their work and would/could punish the 
organization and/or individual. In regard to the English speaking criteria, per Thomas 
Harré, director of Slave Free Seas legal advocacy, because of the United Kingdom’s 
historic leadership in the human rights sector dating back to the abolitionist movement, 
and the global nature of slavery, most inter-organization communication is already 
conducted in English (personal communication, July 5, 2017). Therefore, most agency 
staff members are fluent in English regardless of location.  
The sample was a non-probability, purposive sample as participants were 
interested persons with the time and availability to participate in an interview when 
recruited. Due to the limited number of organizations available for participation, the 
author tried to maintain a balanced sample across continents, services provided (i.e., legal 
services, advocacy, etc.), type of fishery (i.e., large scale, small scale, and artisanal), and 
organization’s focus (i.e., an anti-slavery organization versus an environmental 
organization). While Southeast Asia was well-represented in the study, the researcher 
also wanted to ensure that the study did not focus exclusively on this region as to date, 
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most literature and research has, ignoring the issue in other parts of the world. Due to the 
global setting, the study sample was also diverse in terms of age, gender, race and 
ethnicity, and organizational focus (Table 1).  
Recruitment. The researcher used multiple approaches to recruitment. First, the 
investigator posted a digital recruitment flyer to the Freedom Collaborative—an online, 
members-only platform intended to securely and confidentially connect anti-slavery 
NGOs and other stakeholders across 55 countries to facilitate information sharing, 
collaboration, and research. Part of the platform is a message board available to all 500+ 
member organizations and 2,000+ stakeholders where the researcher posted the flyer. 
Each member organization and stakeholder also has access to personal messaging 
through the platform, and the investigator sent the recruitment flyer via the personal 
messaging option to organizations and stakeholders previously engaged in fisheries 
threads on the platform (threads were archived and were available to the researcher for 
searching).  
In the second approach, the investigator sent recruitment emails to environmental 
NGOs that have previously published reports on labor abuses in the fishing sector (e.g., 
Greenpeace and Environmental Justice Foundation) and immigration/migration and anti-
slavery NGOs working in the fishing sector and who were not part of the Freedom 
Collaborative. The researcher generated this list of organizations from a comprehensive 
literature review performed, mining of NGO social media platforms, and communications 
with experts in the field from around the globe to prevent geographic biases. 
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Lastly, the investigator used snowball sampling wherein enrolled participants 
referred other potential participants to the study. Study recruitment was also aided when 
one participant served on a panel sponsored by the Freedom Collaborative and endorsed 
the study and called attention to the recruitment messaging posted on the Freedom 
Collaborative’s online platform. This panel was disseminated as a webinar, and thus 
reached diverse audiences globally. 
All potential participants who contacted the investigator indicating interest in 
participating were screened to ensure they met the study’s eligibility criteria. These 
screening questions occurred before the consent process so that the individual’s response 
to the name of their NGO was not linked to their interview responses, protecting privacy. 
The screening questions were as follows, and were conducted over email: 
1) “Do you have direct contact with fishers in the context of your normal job 
responsibilities?” 
2) “Please identify the NGO that you are affiliated with.”  
3) “Are you able to participate in an interview conducted in English?” 
4) “Are you at least 18 years of age?” 
All recruitment materials are included in Appendix B. 
Sample size. The study’s total sample was 44 participants. Using the methods 
described in “Recruitment”, 27 out of 51 (52.9%) prospective participants who were 
individually approached by the researcher were recruited and enrolled in the study. The 
remaining 24 (47.1%) did not reply to the researcher’s initial recruitment contact. An 
additional 13 participants were recruited through the general flyer posting, and four 
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participants were recruited and enrolled through snowball sampling for the final sample 
size of 44 participants. Sample demographics are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Sample Demographics (n = 44) 
Variable Variable category n Percent of  
sample 
Age    
 20-29 years n = 4  9.1% 
 30-39 years n = 9 20.5% 
 40-49 years n = 13 29.5% 
 50-59 years n = 15 34.1% 
 60-69 years n = 3 6.8% 
Race/Ethnicity    
 Asian n = 12 27.3% 
 Black n = 2 4.5% 
 Latinx n = 2 4.5% 
 Pacific Islander n = 1 2.3% 
 White n = 26 59.1% 
 Other n = 1 2.3% 
Gender    
 Female n = 14 31.8% 
 Male n = 30 68.2% 
Education    
 Primary n = 2  4.5% 
 High school n = 8 18.2% 
 College n = 10 22.7% 
 Graduate schooling n = 24 54.6% 
Organizational Focus    
 Environment n = 18 40.9% 
 Labor & human rights n = 12 27.3% 
 Maritime crime & regulations n = 6 13.6% 
 Migration & immigration n = 8 18.2% 
Regional Focus    
 North America n = 3 6.8% 
 Europe n = 5 11.4% 
 Southeast Asia n = 15 34.1% 
 Africa n = 3 6.8% 
 Pacific, Oceania, & Australasia n = 3 6.8% 
 Global n = 15 34.1% 
Years of Experience    
 Less than 10 n = 10  22.7% 
 10-19 n = 12 27.3% 
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 20-29 n = 14 31.8% 
 30-39 n = 8 18.2% 
Employment as a Fisher    
 No n = 33 75.0% 
 Former n = 4 4 (9.1%) 
 Current n = 7 7 (15.9%) 
 
To protect against bias and subjectivity in determining theoretical data saturation, 
the study used an average accumulation curve with the Monte Carlo technique to 
calculate sample size (Colwell, Mao, & Chang, 2004; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). In this 
approach, mathematical modeling considering known map concepts and the presence of 
an unknown quantity of undisclosed concepts generates an accumulation curve that 
extrapolates the number of new themes that could potentially be yielded if more maps 
were added to the sample (Tran, Procher, Tran, & Ravaud, 2017). A researcher-specified 
number of iterations randomizes the sample order, producing multiple curves that are 
then aggregated into the final accumulation curve (Colwell & Coddington, 1994), with 
each data point on the final curve representing the mean value of these randomizations 
(Kristensen & Balslev, 2003). The slope of the accumulation curve—at the point of 
tangency—with a cut-off established a priori, then becomes the criterion for concluding 
recruitment (Tran et al., 2017). 
In this study, the accumulation curve was based on the cumulative number of 
unique map variables obtained per participant as a function of the number of participants’ 
maps in the sample (Colwell et al., 2004; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). The slope value was 
set at ≤ 0.05, or one new concept for every 20 maps, for stopping recruitment. Since the 
methodology originated in ecology to estimate species richness and abundance, and has 
only recently started being applied to qualitative research, the literature does not provide 
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a rationale for selecting a number of iterations. As such, this study used 20 iterations 
since a relatively small sample size was projected at the onset of the study based on 
previous research using FCM. 
The EstimateS v. 9.1.0 software was used to sequentially calculate an 
accumulation curve based on 20 randomizations, and its slope after every five maps in 
the study up until 35 participants (Tran et al., 2017). The slope of the expected cognitive 
map concept accumulation curve after the inclusion of 35 participants was 0.021 (Figure 
6). The slope at the point of tangency at 32 participants was also calculated, since on a 
graph this appeared to be where the slope was the steepest (and thus error would be at its 
highest), and was 0.034. The asymptote was estimated to be at 36 participants. Based on 
this approach, the sample size of 44 participants and maps thus achieved theoretical 
saturation.  
 
Figure 6. Accumulation Curve for Sample Size Estimation
Figure 6. Final accumulation curve comparing the diversity of concepts based on the number of maps sampled. The curve was 
used to extrapolate the number of concepts that would likely be produced if the entire population was sampled. 
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Each participant and their fuzzy cognitive map counted as one data point, no 
matter how many fishers’ experiences they included or aggregated in the map’s creation. 
If multiple participants were interviewed from the same organization, then each interview 
counted as a separate data point. Multiple participants from the same organization were 
only included if the participants differed in their country or fishing community of focus. 
Expert Mapping 
Prior to data collection with participants, the researcher created an expert derived 
FCM (Figure 7). The expert mapping activity is intended to provide the foundation for 
theory building and aides in hypothesis generation, selecting study site(s) and population, 
and developing the interview schedule (Gray et al., 2014). The first step of the expert 
mapping was identifying the system’s key variables through a directed content analysis, 
of existing literature (Gray et al., 2014). The content analysis is described as directed 
since initial coding was guided by Brashares et al.’s (2014) theory and a global review of 
key literature on fisheries, overfishing, forced labor, and modern slavery (Hsieh & 




After identification of variables for each pertinent construct noted in Figure 1, a 
directed content analysis of peer-reviewed empirical literature and trend analyses of open 
source data was used to generate inferences about direction and strength of cause-
linkage-effect relationships between variables (Gray et al., 2014).  Empirical data 
regarding the contextual constructs were obtained from the 2016 and 2017 Global 
Slavery Indices (ILO & Walk Free Foundation, 2017; Walk Free Foundation, 2016). 
Fisheries data was obtained from FAO FishStatJ and the Sea Around Us Project, both 
open source fisheries repositories (FAO, 2017a; Sea Around Us, 2017). The expert 
derived map was then transcribed into the Mental Modeler software. 
In the FCM methodology, the generation of an expert derived map functioned 
similarly to bracketing techniques, encouraging the researcher to acknowledge and 
separate attachment to the expert map during date analysis. Often employed in other 
qualitative research methodologies, bracketing reduced the influence of the researcher’s 
Figure 7. Expert Map
Figure 7. Researcher’s model of the relationship between fish stock declines and forced labor slavery constructed in the Mental Modeler 
software. Blue lines indicate a positive relationship wherein an increase in the transmitter variable causes an increase in the receiver variable. 
Orange lines indicate a negative relationship wherein an increase in the transmitter variable causes a decrease in the receiver variable. 
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biases resulting from preconceptions and extreme familiarity with the research topic 
(Creswell, 2013; Tufford & Newman, 2012).  
Data Collection   
Interview and mapping procedures. The author of this dissertation, herein 
referred to as the researcher, completed all interviews and data collection. Once 
participants enrolled in the study, they completed either face-to-face or web-based semi-
structured interviews that included self-construction of a cognitive map intended to 
measure how fish stock declines would influence human decision-making about whether 
or not to use forced labor slavery. All maps were drawn in front of each participant by the 
researcher in the Mental Modeler software (see Figure 8 for an example map), and as 
described by the participant, to ensure consistency across differing interview modalities. 
Twenty-six web-based interviews were conducted using the Zoom platform, while the 
remaining 18 (40.9%) interviews, including the first four participant interviews 
completed, were conducted in-person. Interviews were selected over focus groups due to 
the topic’s sensitivity and power dynamics that could have suppressed marginalized 
identities in focus groups (Stringer & Simmons, n.d.). Further, research suggests 
theoretical saturation is more likely to be reached in FCM when using interviews instead 




An interview schedule including fuzzy cognitive mapping facilitation is included 
in Appendix B. After the researcher formulated the initial interview schedule, the 
questions and mapping activity were piloted with four persons, whose data were not 
included in the study. After the pilot, the researcher obtained feedback on the questions 
and facilitation of the mapping activity and edited the interview schedule as necessary, 
resulting in the final, appended interview schedule. Interview duration ranged from 43 
minutes and 15 seconds to 112 minutes and 59 seconds, with a mean interview time of 85 
minutes and 55 seconds. 
For some participants, the interview started with closed-ended demographic 
questions followed by open-ended questions about their fisheries employment 
experiences. Other participants completed the closed-ended demographic questions in 
advance of the interview via the web-based survey software Qualtrics, and thus their 
interviews started with the questions about fisheries employment experiences (question 9 
Figure 8. Example Participant Map
Figure 8. Example of a participant map constructed in the Mental Modeler software. Blue lines indicate a positive relationship wherein an 
increase in the transmitter variable causes an increase in the receiver variable. Orange lines indicate a negative relationship wherein an increase 
in the transmitter variable causes a decrease in the receiver variable. 
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in the appended interview schedule). After the demographic and employment questions, 
the researcher explained how to draw a cognitive map using an unrelated and neutral 
example that was culturally relevant, and differed based on the participant’s home 
country (Taber, 1991). For instance, one unrelated example concerned drought and 
increased energy prices impacts on the dynamics of a farm. Once the participant indicated 
understanding of the mapping process, the researcher proceeded with the mapping 
exercise included open-ended questions about ecological knowledge, labor conditions, 
and then linkages between fish stocks and labor conditions as disclosed by fishers and 
that they themselves may have observed. Probing questions were added to the interview 
as needed. The only two variables participants were provided at the beginning of variable 
brainstorming were “fish stocks” and “labor conditions”. In the FCM literature, some 
studies have provided participants with a list of variables to choose from (Gray et al., 
2014), while others have only provided two to three key variables (typically one variable 
to identify the problem and one to identify the outcome of interest) to help bound the 
system and maintain the mapping activity’s relevance to the research question (Nyaki et 
al, 2014). The latter approach was selected to reduce the researcher’s bias and influence 
and to maximize the participant’s knowledge construction (Kosko, 1986). Participants 
also had the ability to eliminate either or both of these variables during the iterative 
mapping process, and indeed, participants who felt that fish stock declines were not 




While the participant was speaking, the researcher recorded key variables and 
constructs in the Mental Modeler software. As indicated in the interview schedule, at 
various time points and after set questions, the researcher paused questioning and 
together with the participant reviewed the list of key variables. Once the participant 
approved the list of key variables, the researcher then asked the participant how the 
variables should be arranged. The researcher also facilitated questions to aid the 
participant in identifying relationships between variables (known as nodes in directed 
graph theory) and assessments of the relationships’ direction and strength (see interview 
schedule in Appendix A for further detail). Because the relationship’s direction was 
based on a directed edge-connection, participants were asked to delineate between the 
source (i.e., cause) variable and the target (i.e., outcome) variable when identifying and 
describing a relationship between two variables. Promoting relationships, defined as 
increases in the source variable causing increases in the target variable, were signed with 
a +. Inhibiting relationships, defined as the increases in the source variable causing 
decreases in the target variable, were signed with a -. Demarked by a 0, no edge 
relationships implied the relationship was bidirectional, and the two variables neutralized 
each other (Axelrod, 1976). Signs were denoted in the software by the researcher. If 
participants did not know if a relationship existed, no relationship was entered. For 
participants who added relationships that they were unsure or less sure about, the Mental 
Modeler software allowed the researcher to indicate degree of certainty for each entered 
relationship. While this value did not impact the adjacency matrix, it was noted in the 
map via color-coding, and thus could be assessed qualitatively during map aggregation. 
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Regarding relationship strength, participants were first asked to weight the 
relationship qualitatively (low, medium, high), and then to translate their qualitative 
weightings into quantitative weightings using the scale delineated in Table 2. These 
weightings were also denoted in the digitized cognitive map by the researcher. 
Participants were able to add and delete variables at any time, and the process was 
iterative, reducing the maps into the participant’s most salient variables (Henly-Shepard 
et al., 2015; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). This process was repeated until the participant had 
no new content to add and indicated their cognitive map accurately described their 
knowledge, experience, and observations. 
Digitization, recording, transcription. Once the participant indicated they had 
completed their cognitive map, it was saved and stored electronically. Interviews, 
including formal interview questions and dialogue while constructing the cognitive map 
were audio recorded. Interviews conducted face-to-face were recorded using a digital 
audio recorder. Interviews conducted via the Zoom platform were recorded using Zoom’s 
audio recording feature and transcribed by the researcher. Recording was optional for all 
participants, and 21 (47.7%) participants declined to have their interview recorded.  
All data collection methods and procedures were approved by the University of 








Scales for Converting Qualitative Weightings into Quantitative Weightings for FCMs 
Qualitative Weighting Quantitative Weighting Range 
No relationship 0 
Low/weak relationship 0.1 to 0.3 or -0.1 to -0.3 
Medium/moderate relationship 0.4 to 0.7 or -0.4 to -0.7 
High/strong relationship 0.8 to 1.0 or -0.8 to -1.0 
 
Data Analysis 
Coded cognitive maps for simplification. To achieve aim one, an iterative, 
systematic, and inductive thematic content analysis (i.e., coding) of each participant’s 
interview transcript and/or notes and map were used to condense each map’s variables 
into the major variables most pertinent to the two phenomena under investigation—fish 
stocks and forced labor (Figure 9) (Buede & Ferrell, 1993; Harary, Norman, & 
Cartwright, 1965; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). Since the FCM literature does not specify 
the coding techniques that should be used in data analysis, the researcher used techniques 
consistent with grounded theory. As such, the researcher employed in-vivo, process, and 
initial coding for first-cycle coding techniques and focused, axial, and theoretical coding 
for second-cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013). This process included using interview quotes to 
attribute meaning and definitions to map variables, and combining similar variables into 
over-arching themes as is typical in qualitative data analysis (Saldaña, 2013). Condensing 
the maps into major themes, constructs, and/or variables is considered a “best practice” 
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and intended to make comparisons across maps and map aggregation more interpretable 
(Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). The data-driven, inductive approach was selected to limit the 
researcher’s influence and to center the participant’s knowledge construction (Fereday & 
Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Coding of transcripts and maps was completed in Dedoose, as 
well as memoing wherein rigorous notes were maintained on the researcher’s cognitive 
interpretation of each map for greater transparency and to create an audit trail (Özesmi & 
Özesmi, 2004; Thomas, 2017). Memoing that occurred during data collection was also 
transcribed into Dedoose.  
 
Inter-rater reliability. After the researcher initially coded all interview transcripts, 
notes, and maps, a codebook was generated. The codebook was then supplied to an 
outside research assistant, trained in FCM, who independently coded all transcripts, 
notes, and maps. Inter-rater reliability was then measured as a percentage of agreement 
between the researcher and research assistant in the application of codes and 
Figure 9. Example Participant Map Coded
Figure 9. Example participant map represented in Fig. 8 after being coded by the researcher. 
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condensation of maps. With percentages ranging from 83% to 96% agreement, the inter-
rater reliability for all variables was deemed acceptable. Areas of substantial 
disagreement between the researcher and research assistant (e.g., when the research 
assistant felt that a necessary code was not included in the codebook) were negotiated 
until a consensus was achieved (Patton, 1999). 
Converted cognitive maps into adjacency matrices. Using structural models 
derived from graph theory, each cognitive map was converted by the Mental Modeler 
software into an adjacency matrix (see Table 3)—the standard mathematical 
representation of a graph or the quantification of a cognitive map—to accomplish aim 
two (Harary et al., 1965; Kosko, 1986; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). In graph theory, each 
variable in the cognitive map operates as a vertex (also known as a node). Edges are the 
lines between each variable indicating a relationship. The software transformed the map 
into a square adjacency matrix based on counts of the number of edges between adjacent 
vertices—variables that shared at least one common edge. In this study, edges were both 
directed and weighted in that participants were asked to identify the source and target 
variables (orienting the relationship direction) and then assigned a qualitative and 
quantitative weight to describe the relationship strength (Harary et al., 1965; Kosko, 
1986). Directing and weighting the edges allowed for more complex structural analyses 
of the matrices. 
Analyzed individual maps with graph theory indices and metrics. Graph 
theory variable influence indices and structural map metrics were calculated from the 
adjacency matrix (see Table 4 for a complete list). All metrics and indices were 
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calculated in the Mental Modeler software. Standard measures included a count of the 
number of variables and connections (i.e., edges). Edge indegree and outdegree were 
calculated to classify variables as transmitter (forcing or independent variables), receiver 
(end or dependent variables), or ordinary (defined as mean variables that possess both 
force and receive) variables (Eden, Ackerman, & Cropper, 1992). Degree centrality, 
connectedness, and density were computed from variable indices and map metrics to 
elicit further information about each graph’s structure, fulfilling aim two (Özesmi & 
Özesmi, 2004).  
Table 3 
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  Note. This adjacency matrix corresponds with the participant map depicted in  




Compared individual maps. All interviews and map facilitations were 
conducted by the same researcher to allow for individual map comparisons using 
qualitative and quantitative comparison strategies further described below (Özesmi & 
Özesmi, 2004). These comparisons were intended to 1) test reliability across different 
interview modalities and 2) elucidate important, likely contextual, variables confounding 
the relationship between fish stocks and slavery, achieving aim three. 
Initially maps were divided into two groups, with all maps in one group noting 
some type of relationship between fish stock declines and labor conditions, and all maps 
in the second group not identifying a relationship between fish stock declines and labor 
conditions. Maps in the second group were analyzed separately, akin to a negative case 
analysis, as another strategy to identify potential mediators, moderators, and buffering 
effects (Patton, 1999).  
Table 4 
Standard FCM Variable Indices and Structural Metrics  
Metric Definition Purpose Formula Source 
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Comparative content analysis of variables. Using a directed, comparative content 
analysis, the researcher constructed a present/absent variable index categorizing all 
variables and their definitions across all 44 maps as common, partially common, or 
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uncommon concepts (Clarke & Mackaness, 2001). Proportional to sample size, common 
concepts indicated the variable was used in at least 22 maps and uncommon concepts 
were unique variables that were only identified by one participant. Partially common 
concepts were variables that were included in a minimum of two and maximum of 21 
maps (Clarke & Mackaness, 2001). Variable definitions were derived from the original 
interview coding as described previously. This index was used to identify similarities and 
differences in variable inclusion and exclusion between participants. 
Variable rankings. Variables were then ranked into three separate lists including 
most mentioned variables, variable types, and most central variables (Özesmi & Özesmi, 
2004). Most mentioned variables were a list of the top 10 variables in frequency across 
all 44 maps. Variable types included sub-lists of the top 10 transmitter, receiver, and 
ordinary variables across all maps. All previously listed variables were then ranked by 
their centrality (see Table 4 for definition and formula), an index of the variable’s 
importance to the entire system. These lists were then used to identify similarities and 
differences in variable importance and role amongst the 44 participants. 
Structural indices comparisons. The graph theory indices including C/N ratio, 
complexity, and density were also compared across all participants. These measures were 
used to identify similarities and differences in map structure, particularly how connected 
or sparse (i.e., how complex) each map was and how strongly individual variables 
influenced the entire system (Yoon & Jetter, 2016). 
Pairwise comparisons. Once qualitative coding techniques provided preliminary 
reasoning for grouping like maps, quantitative pairwise analyses corroborated similarity 
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between group members’ variables. Since each participant’s map already had a 
corresponding adjacency matrix, the Phi similarity coefficient and the Yule Q coefficient 
were calculated for count variables (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). A matrix of counts created 
from the individual adjacency matrices was used to calculate both coefficients. For the 
Phi similarity coefficient, values ranged from -1 to 1, with 1/-1 indicating most similar. 
The Yule Q coefficient was “the proportionate reduction in errors in predicting whether 
or not one group has the variable” and therefore was used to confirm the Phi values 
(Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004, p. 52). 
Identifying commonalities. Based on the comparative content analysis, variable 
ranking, and pairwise structural indices comparisons, the researcher identified similar 
participants. Once similar participants were identified, the researcher returned to the 
coded interviews to ascertain commonalities, particularly demographic, amongst the 
similar participants. Similar participants were then grouped by commonalities, for 
example, former fishers versus non-former fishers. 
Group comparisons. For each group, the mean value for participants’ metrics 
and indices reported in Table 3 were calculated. Each outcome variable’s skewness was 
between negative two and positive two, and kurtosis between 0 and positive three, 
meeting the normality assumptions for univariate tests (George & Mallery, 2010). To 
assesses similarities and differences between group means, ANOVA and independent 
samples t-tests for variables with two groups were performed (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004; 
Palmquist, Carley, & Dale, 1997). A series of univariate ANOVAs were selected over the 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) since FCM violates multiple 
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assumptions—particularly small cell numbers and high multicollinearity since some 
dependent variables are calculated, in part, from other dependent variables. As such, 
Bonferroni corrections of p ≤ .008 for the ANOVAs and p ≤ .01 for the independent 
samples t-tests were applied to reduce Type I error inflation. However, both the adjusted 
and non-adjusted significant findings are presented in the Results chapter since these 
FCM quantitative analyses ideally prove the null hypothesis of similarity to aid in map 
aggregation. Thus the absence of the Bonferroni correction is the more conservative 
approach.  
For comparisons amongst demographic variables race, education, and former 
employment as a fisher were recoded due to small sample sizes for some groups. Race 
was recategorized as White, Asian, and other—which included the original other 
category in addition to Black, LatinX, and Pacific Islander. For education, primary school 
and high school were combined into a category of high school or less. Lastly, the variable 
employment as a fisher was transformed into a dichotomous, nominal variable wherein 
the categories of current and former fisher were combined into a “yes” category. SPSS v. 
23.0 software was used to perform the ANOVAs and independent samples t-tests. 
Created cumulative consensus map. Individual maps were then aggregated into 
one cumulative, consensus, social cognitive map using both qualitative and quantitative 
procedures. To begin, the researcher selected which variables to include in the aggregated 
FCM based on a content analysis of the variable rankings lists, graph theory indices 
comparison table, and results elucidated from the group comparisons about the role of 
potential mediators, moderators, and contextual factors. Using vector-matrix operations 
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and the creation of augmented matrices that listed every variable used in the individual 
matrices, common matrix components were added or averaged to infer the sign and 
strength of each connection in the aggregated map (Halbrendt et al., 2014; Henly-
Shepard, 2015; Kosko, 1992; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). All vector-matrix operations 
were completed in the Mental Modeler software. In this approach, consensus amongst 
participants strengthened the fuzzy causal relationship in the aggregated map, whereas, 
dissent was still recognized (and added to the map’s complexity) but weakened the fuzzy 
causal relationships (Kosko, 1992).  
Returning to aim one, once finalized, the cumulative consensus map was used to 
refine the amended Brashares et al. (2014) Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict 
framework posited by Decker Sparks & Hasche (2018).  
Established system’s steady state. Prior to performing the case scenario analyses 
needed to fulfill aim four, the researcher established the consensus map’s steady state—
what happens to the outcome of interest (forced labor slavery) if there are no 
interventions and fish stock levels stagnate, meaning stock declines will level off, but 
stocks will not rebound and increase either. Using a neural network computational 
method (Kosko, 1992) where initial state variable vectors were multiplied by the 
adjacency matrix, iterations were run by the Mental Modeler software until the “system 
converged to a fixed point” (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004, p. 55). That fixed point was then 
the steady state or baseline for comparisons to assess the value of variable changes in 
case scenarios described below (Devisscher, 2016).  
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Executed case-scenario simulations. Running case scenario analyses allowed 
the researcher to generate “what if” inferences based on the current relationships between 
system components and assumptions of plausible scenarios, and achieve the study’s 
fourth aim (Devisscher et al., 2016). Four scenarios were tested. Two scenarios explored 
both problem intensification and amelioration while the third and fourth scenarios tested 
interventions. All four scenarios were developed once the consensus map was finalized 
and analyzed and were based on transmitter variables and target variables with the high 
degrees of centrality (Devisscher et al., 2016).  
For scenario runs, the same mathematical calculations (vector-matrix 
multiplication) used in the baseline determination were replicated, but this time included 
manipulation of targeted variables and/or the weights of causal connections in the 
consensus map (Devisscher et al., 2016).  Because the FCMs and consensus map were 
semi-quantitative, scenario outcomes were not “compared with absolute indicators but 
rather interpreted as a summary of relationships between variables and changes [in those 









Chapter Four: Results 
This chapter presents the quantitative and qualitative analyses of participants’ 
individual maps and interviews, with the similarities in problem construction across 
diverse participants demonstrating the universality and systemic nature of the problem 
globally. Following individual map analyses is the map aggregation results and a detailed 
explication of each variable and relationship in the consensus map, as supported by the 
qualitative analysis of participants’ maps and interviews. 
The pervading sentiment expressed by study participants was that the relationship 
between overfishing-induced fish stock declines and forced labor slavery was “like a 
tangled web” in that fish stock declines led to other reverberating changes throughout the 
linked social and ecological systems which ultimately contributed to changes in forced 
labor slavery. Participants also clearly articulated that incidents of fish stock declines 
relating to forced labor slavery were not isolated cases, but rather representative of a 
systemic, widespread problem that is likely “severely underestimated and still 
increasing.” Out of the 44 participants, 41 (93.2%) stated that since 2010 they had seen 
substantial increases in the number of forced labor slavery victims from fishing vessels. 
Acknowledging that a portion of this increase could be shifts in the content and delivery 
of questions professionals ask to accurately determine if someone has been victimized or 
not, all 41 participants stated the majority of the increase should be attributed to a 
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growing problem that “started slowly, and is now snowballing.” Participants also 
discredited claims that more victims are coming forward to report abuses and/or seek 
services, saying that most victims lack the education and comprehension of the English 
language to consume media content that would help them identify themselves as a victim. 
In total, 32 out of 44 (72.7%) participants linked fish stock declines and forced 
labor slavery in their cognitive maps. Per data obtained from participants, forced labor 
slavery related to fish stock declines was occurring on both short and long-haul vessels 
that fished primarily for low and mid-value fish (e.g., white, albacore tuna), on trawlers 
and long-line vessels, and in territorial and international waters (i.e., the high seas). 
Figure 10 represents all countries mentioned by participants where victims and vessels 
originated from, as well as the flag state of vessels caught using forced labor slavery, and 
territorial waters where vessels were known or suspected of using forced labor slavery. 
The most cited countries of origin for victims were Cambodia, Indonesia, India, 
Myanmar, and the Philippines. Specific to the vessels, participants were less familiar with 
flag states, since many of the implicated vessels flew multiple flags or changed their 
flags. However, the most frequently noted countries of origin for vessels were Thailand, 
Spain, China, and Taiwan (whose fishing fleet participants considered distinct from 
China’s). The territorial waters of concern referenced by the most participants were 
Senegal, Indonesia, and South Africa—though participants noted that the forced labor 
occurring in these waters was typically on foreign, not domestic, vessels. The Indian and 
southern Pacific oceans were the most frequently indicated locations for vessels using 
forced labor slavery on the high seas.  
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 Bivariate and multivariate analyses were used to determine if demographic 
variables (see Table 1 for variables) along with interview modality were associated with 
and/or significant predictors of whether a participant linked fish stock decline and forced 
labor slavery in their cognitive map. First, bivariate Chi-square tests of independence 
were performed. As detailed in Table 5, organizational focus was the only demographic 
variable significantly related to linking fish stock declines and forced labor slavery. All 
other demographic variables, and interview modality, were independent from linking fish 
stocks and slavery, though it should be noted that most analyses had at least 1 cell with a 
count less than five, and Age and Region had more than 20% of its cells with counts less 
than five. 
Table 5 
Chi-Square Tests of Independence between Demographic Variables and Forced Labor 
Slavery 
 






Organizational Focus 𝒳2(3)	=	8.08,	p	=	.04* 
Region 𝒳2(5)	=	5.01,	p	=	.42 
Years of Experience 𝒳2(3)	=	2.67,	p	=	.45 
Fisherman 𝒳2(1)	=	.61,	p	=	.43 
*p < .05 
aAt least one cell, but less than 20% of cells with counts less than five 
bMore than 20% of cells with counts less than five 
 
A binary logistic regression model was then used to determine if demographic 
variables (see Table 1 for variables) along with interview modality were significant 
predictors of whether a participant linked fish stock declines and forced labor slavery in 
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their cognitive map. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test was non-significant, X2(8) = 4.37, p = 
.82, thus it was assumed the model had adequate fit to the data, though low power may 
also explain the high p-value. While the overall model was significant, X2(23) = 51.56, p 
= .001, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that any specific demographic 
predictor or interview modality was significant in explaining whether a participant linked 
fish stock declines and forced labor slavery. Of the 12 participants who did not connect 
the two issues in their cognitive map, seven (58.3%) reported during their interviews that 
they had not previously considered the connection, and therefore had not expanded either 
their ecological view to include social systems or vice versa. 
The two participants purposefully sampled for negative case analyses failed to 
yield insight about confounders distinct from other participants. In particular, the 
participant from Sweden expressed concerns about the presence of slavery in the sector, 
despite popular opinion that Sweden is slave free. The participant reported multiple risk 
factors along Sweden’s maritime border with Russia such as unsustainable stock 
management driven by Russia’s economic interests instead of science, and illegal fishing 
by Russian and Ukrainian vessels. In addition, the participant disclosed recent reports of 
labor abuses of migrant crew members on transport and ice breaking vessels.  
Map Composition 
At the conclusion of data collection, 111 unique variables were identified by the 
44 participants. After two coding cycles, the 111 variables were reduced to 53 variables, 
categorized by number of appearances in the Present/Absent Variable Index (Table 6). 
Excluding the two bounding variables (fish stock declines and forced labor slavery) and 
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the uncommon variables (i.e., the variables only listed by one participant), Figure 11 
ranks each variable by how many maps it appeared in during the study.  After each map 
Figure 10.  Hotspots for Forced Labor Slavery in the Fishing Industry 
 
Figure 10. Map of the world depicting which countries participants identified as  
being origin countries for victims and vessels, flag states, and countries whose  




was converted to an adjacency matrix, structural metrics were calculated (Table 7). Map 
composition was then further elucidated by using these metrics to rank the top 10 
transmitter, receiver, and ordinary variables, and the 10 most central variables (Table 8).  
Map Comparisons 
Quantitative pairwise comparisons of map composition determined two distinct 
groups with high levels of similarity in variable inclusion (i.e., more than 50% of the 
pairwise comparisons yielded a Phi coefficient and Yule Q coefficient of 0.7 or higher). 
The first grouping was participants with at least 20-29 years of experience and whose 
organizational focus was on maritime crime and regulations. Similar pertinent variables 
in this group’s maps included transshipment and supply chain complexity. The second 
grouping was participants whose regional focus was Southeast Asia and who were 
currently or previously employed as fishers. Their similar pertinent variables included 
xenophobia, racism, and marginalization of small-scale fishers. 
Table 6 
Present/Absent Variable Index for Individual Participant Maps 
Common 
Variables  
(n ≥ 22) 
Partially Common  
Variables 
(2 ≤ n ≤ 21)  
Uncommon 
Variables 
(n = 1) 
Regulatory problems 
and challenges 











Profit margins Fishing costs Fishing safety Limited data 




 Use of foreign and migrant 
workers, often 
undocumented 
Risk Ocean warming 
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 Labor shortages Political 
instability 
Shell companies 
 Racism Geographic 
remoteness 
Subsidies 
 Supply chain complexity Globalization  













 Marginalization of small-
scale and/or legal fishers 
Capitalism  





 Monopolization of resources Governance  





 Demand for cheap labor Nationalism  


















0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Regulatory problems and challenges
















Marginalization of small-scale and/or legal fisheries
Fisheries interventions and regulatory reforms
Monopolization of resources
Xenophobia & stricter immigration laws




Market prices for fish
Risk















Figure 11. Number of Models Including Each Variable
Number of Maps


























1 15 30 0.14 2.00 3 0 12 0 
2 16 33 0.14 2.06 1 3 12 3 
3 12 21 1.16 1.75 3 1 8 0.33 
4 16 27 0.11 1.69 2 2 12 1 
5 9 17 0.24 1.89 1 1 7 1 
6 10 14 0.16 1.40 2 0 8 0 
7 11 13 1.12 1.18 3 2 6 0.67 
8 11 16 1.15 1.45 2 1 8 0.5 
9 11 16 1.15 1.45 1 2 8 2 
10 10 16 0.18 1.60 1 1 8 1 
11 7 10 0.24 1.43 3 0 4 0 
12 12 17 1.13 1.42 3 2 7 0.67 
13 6 6 0.20 1 3 2 1 0.67 
14 8 11 0.20 1.38 1 1 6 1 
15 9 10 0.14 1.11 2 2 5 1 
16 10 12 0.13 1.20 3 1 6 0.33 
17 8 12 0.21 1.50 1 1 6 1 
18 12 22 0.17 1.83 2 2 8 1 
19 14 20 0.11 1.43 3 4 7 1.33 
20 21 33 0.08 1.57 5 4 12 0.8 
21 13 18 0.12 1.38 4 1 8 0.25 
22 12 16 0.12 1.33 5 1 6 0.2 
23 15 20 0.10 1.33 5 1 9 0.2 
24 9 12 0.17 1.33 5 1 3 0.2 
25 17 25 0.09 1.47 4 2 11 0.5 
26 15 20 0.10 1.33 5 1 9 0.2 
27 5 5 0.25 1.00 3 1 1 0.33 
28 9 13 0.18 1.44 0 1 8 Infinity 
29 12 16 1.12 1.33 2 1 9 0.5 
30 14 21 1.16 1.50 5 0 9 0 
31 13 15 0.10 1.15 5 2 6 0.4 
32 7 7 0.17 1.00 0 2 5 Infinity 
33 5 4 0.20 0.80 1 1 3 1 
34 9 13 0.18 1.44 1 2 6 2 
35 10 13 0.14 1.30 4 1 5 0.25 
36 7 8 0.19 1.14 3 1 3 0.33 
37 8 7 0.13 0.88 5 1 2 0.2 
38 12 21 0.16 1.75 3 0 0 0 
39 9 8 0.11 0.89 4 3 2 0.75 
40 16 20 0.08 1.25 4 1 11 0.25 
41 7 8 0.19 1.14 3 1 3 0.33 
42 7 8 0.19 1.14 2 0 5 0 
43 12 17 0.13 1.42 1 0 11 0 
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 According to univariate, one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) there were no 
statistically significant differences in map structure (i.e., the mean number of vertices, 
edges, transmitter, receiver, and ordinary variables and the mean density, connectedness, 
and complexity) across participants regardless of organizational focus, education, and 
race (Table 9). However, mean map density differed amongst years of experience (F(3, 
38) = 3.87, p = .02) and age (F(3, 38) = 4.07, p = .01). Specific to years of experience, 
Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances was significant (F(3, 40) = 10.11, p < .001), and 
post hoc Dunnett’s T3 testing indicated a significant difference (p = .016) in mean 
density between less than 10 years of experience (?̅?	= .66, s = .52) and 11-19 years of 
experience (?̅?	= .14, s = .04). For age, homogeneity of variance was not assumed (F(4, 
39) = 103.88, p < .001), and post hoc Dunnett’s T3 testing indicated a significant 
difference (p = .04) in mean density between 40-49 years (?̅?	= .54, s = .49) and 60-69 
years (?̅?	= .11, s = .03). Additionally, the mean number of vertices (F(3, 38) = 3.94, p = 
.006) and edges (F(3, 38) = 4.13, p = .005) differed across region, and were the only 
statistically significant findings after the application of the Bonferroni adjustment. 
Regarding vertices, Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances was not significant (F(5, 38) 
= 1.43, p < .24), and post hoc Tukey’s testing indicated a significant difference (p = .019) 
in mean vertices between Africa (?̅?	= 7.33, s = 2.08) and North America (?̅?	= 15.0, s = 
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2.65). Assuming homogeneity of variances, (F(5, 38) = 1.26, p = .30), post hoc Tukey’s 
testing indicated a significant difference (p = .019) in mean edges between Southeast 
Asia (?̅?	= 13.13, s = 4.66) and North America (?̅?	= 26.33, s = 6.11); a significant 
difference (p = 0.2) between Africa (?̅?	= 9.33, s = 3.79) and North America (?̅?	= 26.33, s 
= 6.11); and a significant difference (p = .023) between the Pacific (?̅?	= 9.67, s = 2.89) 
and North America (?̅?	= 26.33, s = 6.11). Lastly, mean connectedness differed by years of 
experience (F(3, 38) = 2.98, p = 0.4). Assuming equal variances (F(3, 40) = .38, p = .77, 
post hoc Tukey’s testing indicated a statistically significant difference in mean 
connectedness (p = 0.48) between 20-29 (?̅?	= 1.20, s = .28)  and 30-39 (?̅?	= 1.56, s = .32)  
years of experience.  
For demographic variables with only two groups (i.e., gender and former 
employment as a fisher), independent samples t-tests did not find statistically significant 
differences in map structure (i.e., the mean number of vertices, edges, transmitter, 
receiver, and ordinary variables and the mean density, connectedness, and complexity) 
(Table 10). Whether the interview was recorded and interview modality were also 
assessed. There were no statistically significant differences in map structure metrics 
based on interview modality. However, statistical differences were noted in number of 
map edges, connectedness, number of transmitter, receiver, and ordinary variables, and 














Education Age Race 
Vertices F = .82,  
p = .49 
F = 3.94,  
p = 
.006** 
F = 2.03,  
p = .13 
F = 1.15,  
p = .34 
F = .81,  
p = .53 
F = .99,  
p = .38 
Edges F = 1.52,  
p = .23 
F = 4.13,  
p = 
.005** 
F = 2.87,  
p = .05 
F = 1.76,  
p = .17 
F = .44,  
p = .78 
F = 1.32,  
p = .28 
Density F = .25,  
p = .86 
F = .55,  
p = .74 
F = 3.87,  
p = .02* 
F = 1.02,  
p = .39 
F = 4.07,  
p = 
0.01* 
F = .55,  
p = .58 
Connectedness F = 1.66,  
p = .19 
F = 1.85,  
p = .13 
F = 2.98,  
p = .04* 
F = 2.30,  
p = .09 
F = .26,  
p = .90 
F = 1.42,  
p = .26 
Transmitter 
variables 
F = .55,  
p = .65 
F = 1.15,  
p = .35 
F = .17,  
p = .92 
F = .76,  
p = .52 
F = .43, 
 p = .78 
F = 1.25, 
 p = .30 
Receiver 
variables 
F = .16, 
 p = .92 
F = 1.41,  
p = .24 
F = 1.71,  
p = .18 
F = 2.55,  
p = .07 
F = .51,  
p = .73 
F = .98,  
p = .39 
Ordinary 
variables 
F = .40,  
p = .75 
F = 2.38,  
p = .06 
F = 2.52,  
p = .07 
F = 1.05,  
p = .38 
F = .64,  
p = .64 
F = .90,  
p = .42 
Complexity F = .49,  
p = .69 
F = 1.08,  
p = .39 
F = .93,  
p = .43 
F = 2.66,  
p = .06 
F = .36,  
p = .84 
F = 2.08,  
p = .14 
Note. For each F statistic, the between group degrees of freedom were three, and the 
within group degrees of freedom were 38.  
*p < .05 
** p < .008 (Bonferroni correction) 
 
 Assuming equal variances across all pairwise comparisons5, participants that were 
not recorded had a higher mean number of edges (?̅?	= 17.81, s = 7.59) and ordinary 
variables (?̅?	= 7.57, s = 2.77) and higher mean connectedness (?̅?	= 1.51, s = .28) and 
complexity (?̅?	= .84, s = .69) than participants who were recorded (i.e., edges (?̅?	= 13.17, 
s = 6.12), ordinary variables (?̅?	= 5.52, s = 3.55), connectedness (?̅?	= 1.23, s = .24), and 
complexity (?̅?	= .38, s = .44)). Participants who were recorded; however, had a higher 
                                               
5 Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances: edges (F = .17, p = .68), ordinary variables (F 
= .3.96, p = .055), connectedness (F = .26, p = .61), complexity (F = 2.31, p = .14), and 
transmitter variables (F = 2.69, p = .11). 
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mean number of transmitter variables (?̅?	= 3.26, s = 1.74) than participants who were not 
recorded (?̅?	= 2.33, s = 1.11). Connectedness was the only finding that was statistically 
significant after the application of the Bonferroni correction. 
Table 10 
Independent Samples t-Tests Comparing Map Structure Across Participants 






Vertices t(42) = -.90, 
p = .37 
t(42) = -.34, 
p = .74 
t(42) = 1.35, 
p = .18 
t(42) = 1.10,  
p = .28 
Edges t(42) = -.21, 
p = .84 
t(42) = -1.16, 
p = .25 
t(42) = 1.48, 
p = .15 
t(42) = 2.24, 
p = .05* 
Density t(36.7) = 
1.41, 
p = .17 
t(12.4) = -1.74, 
p = .11 
t(42) = .77, 
p = .98 
t(34.5) = 1.43, 
p = .16 
Connectedness t(42) = .49, 
p = .63 
t(42) = -1.94, 
p = .06 
t(42) = .75, 
p = .46 
t(42) = 3.60,  
p = .001** 
Transmitter 
variables 
t(42) = -1.40, 
p = .17 
t(42) = .68, 
p = .50 
t(28.2) = .61, 
p = .55 
t(37.7) = -2.13 
p = .04* 
Receiver 
variables 
t(42) = .59, 
p = .56 
t(42) = .63, 
p = .53 
t(42) = -.36, 
p = .72 
t(42) = 1.54, 
p = .13 
Ordinary 
variables 
t(42) = -.77, 
p = .44 
t(42) = -1.10, 
p = .28 
t(42) = 1.60, 
p = .12 
t(37.1) = 2.13, 
p = .04* 
Complexity t(40) = 1.34, 
p = .19 
t(11.8) = -.66 , 
p = .52 
t(42) = .18, 
p = .86 
t(40) = 2.52, 
p = .02* 
* p ≤ .05 
** p ≤ .01 (Bonferroni correction) 
 
Map Aggregation  
 To simplify the quantitative aggregation of maps, additional coding occurred after 
individual map analyses to further reduce the 53 map variables. As a result, market prices 
for fish was collapsed into consumer demand, fishing costs was collapsed into profit 
margins, capitalism and globalization were collapsed into race to fish and re-
characterized as a global race to fish, presence of transnational criminal syndicates was 
collapsed into other transnational crime, seafood certification schemes was collapsed into 
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consumer disconnect, and xenophobia, racism, and nationalism were grouped together 
and recoded as discrimination. This additional coding is further clarified in the codebook 
(Appendix C). When variables were collapsed or re-characterized, vector multiplication 
was used to determine the strength of the relationship between the now collapsed 
variables and other system variables. Other variables, such as risk, were eliminated prior 
to vector multiplication since they functioned more as pathway descriptors than distinct 
variables. 
 The vector multiplication of each of the 44 participant maps’ adjacency matrices 
yielded the aggregated consensus map represented in Figure 12 (aim one). Table 11 lists 
the aggregated map’s structural metrics, derived from the quantification of each 
relationships’ strength (aim two). Within the map, there were four transmitter variables 
(global race to fish, political instability, geographic remoteness, and underdeveloped 
economies) and two receiver variables (wildlife crimes and other transnational crime). 
Excluding forced labor slavery, the outcome of interest, the five most central variables in 
the map were profit margins, IUU fishing, regulatory problems and challenges, 
overfishing, and fish stock declines (Table 12). Each of the transmitter most central 
variables were evaluated as potential mediators and moderators of the relationship 
between fish stock declines and forced labor slavery (aim three). A definition for each 
variable used in the aggregated map is included in the study’s codebook in Appendix C. 
Each pathway is also further explicated below using qualitative data from participant 




Figure 12. Cumulative, Consensus Map 
 
 
Figure 12.  The overalls study’s cumulative and aggregated consensus map, produced in 
the Mental Modeler software by using vector multiplication to combine the 44 
































Cumulative and Aggregated Consensus Map Variable Indices 
Variable Indegree Outdegree Centrality Type 
Forced labor slavery 5.56 2.19 7.75 Ordinary 
Profit margins 4.72 2.14 6.86 Ordinary 
IUU fishing 3.50 2.55 6.05 Ordinary 
Regulatory problems and 
challenges 
3.02 1.70 4.72 Ordinary 
Overfishing 3.86 0.72 4.58 Ordinary 
Fish stock declines 2.30 1.50 3.8 Ordinary 
Fishing effort 1.22 2.50 3.72 Ordinary 
Transshipment 1.34 2.28 3.62 Ordinary 
Supply chain complexity 1.22 1.89 3.11 Ordinary 
Discrimination 0.33 2.61 2.94 Ordinary 
Fisheries interventions and 
regulatory reforms 
0.47 2.25 2.72 Ordinary 
Marginalization of small-scale 
fishers 
1.00 1.69 2.69 Ordinary 
Social vulnerabilities 1.84 0.39 2.23 Ordinary 
Disposable vessels 1.11 1.11 2.22 Ordinary 
Use of foreign and migrant 
workers, often undocumented 
0.33 1.81 2.14 Ordinary 
Government inaction 0.89 1.11 2.00 Ordinary 
Global race to fish 0 1.94 1.94 Transmitter 
Consumer demand 0.50 1.09 1.59 Ordinary 
Geographic remoteness 0 1.58 1.58 Transmitter 
Monopolization of remoteness 0.69 0.81 1.50 Ordinary 
Catch-per-unit effort 0.67 0.61 1.28 Ordinary 
Subsidies 0.25 0.83 1.08 Ordinary 
Increased fishing capacity 0.42 0.61 1.03 Ordinary 
Fishing safety 0.75 0.11 0.86 Ordinary 
Consumer disconnect 0.31 0.50 0.81 Ordinary 
Labor shortages 0.33 0.33 0.66 Ordinary 
Wildlife crimes 0.64 0 0.64 Receiver 
Political instability 0 0.39 0.39 Transmitter 
Underdeveloped economy 0 0.22 0.22 Transmitter 





Explication of the Consensus Map’s Social-Ecological System 
 Fish stock pressures. The first issue identified by participants, and supported by 
existing empirical data was the decline of fish stocks in various territorial and 
international waters globally. As noted by one participant who identified as a former or 
current fisher, “Stocks are declining. Everyone knows that. Even people who are not 
working in or with the sector know that. The problem is so pervasive that fish stocks is a 
topic of conversation in elections, town hall meetings, etcetera.” Multiple participants 
across differing regions also described the declines as “fast and extreme,” beginning 
around 2010, and resulting in cumulative fish hauls for fishermen decreasing anywhere 
from 30 to 75% in five years or less.  
 Per participants, both overfishing and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing increased fish stock declines. Examples of IUU activities described by 
participants included underreporting or not reporting catch; the use of environmentally 
damaging methods that, in part, yielded high rates of bycatch; failure to obtain fishing 
licenses; turning off or manipulating vessel tracking devices; and high-grading wherein 
poorer quality fish already caught and likely dead were thrown overboard to 
accommodate higher value fish. One of the drivers of IUU noted by participants was 
political instability (e.g., civil war and disease outbreaks). For example, multiple 
participants relayed an increase in IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea during the West 
Africa Ebola outbreak because governments with already limited capacity to prevent IUU 
had to reallocate funds to more emergent issues. Additionally, IUU fishing increased 
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overfishing, because catch limit and quota calculations did not account for illegally 
harvested fish—which could compromise as much as one-third of all landed fish. 
Therefore, catch thresholds were based on an incorrect, lower cumulative haul which 
likely overestimated the stock size, resulting in the legalized overexploitation of the stock 
beyond sustainable levels. Participants also reported fishing in no-take areas (i.e., areas 
where fishing activities have been banned to help stocks recover or to conserve declining 
stocks). 
 However, not all overfishing (i.e., unsustainable fishing to such an extent that 
stock depletions exceed replacement and recruitment causing the stock to decline) was 
caused by illegal or unregulated activity. Regulatory problems and challenges increased 
overfishing, subsequently increasing fish stock declines, which are a byproduct of 
overfishing. Some participants even described current fisheries regulations as 
“legalizing” overfishing because economic self-interests undermined national and 
international cooperation creating differentiated, rather than common, fishing 
responsibilities that exceed the capacity of shared or common waters. Consequently, this 
“low degree of transboundary coordination and cooperation” resulted in 
uncomprehensive, piecemeal regulations with too narrow of scopes and numerous 
loopholes that left many overly exploitive fishing activities unregulated. This lack of 
cooperation in implementing regulations then also carried over into a lack of 
transboundary enforcement of regulations, particularly concerning IUU fishing, which 
participants ubiquitously identified as a transnational issue. As a result, a lack of political 
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will predicated on economic self-interests further eroded international coordination and 
cooperation. 
 Economic consequences of fish stock declines. During the mapping activity, 
participants described fishing as becoming “more difficult and more expensive,” 
explicating a chain reaction where fish stock declines decreased catch-per-unit-effort, and 
the fishing sector responding with increased fishing effort (e.g., fishing farther, longer, or 
deeper, deploying nets more frequently, and using fishing gear more indiscriminately). 
The increased fishing effort decreased profit margins. As one participant described:  
When stocks decline, catches decline. When catches decline, profits decline 
because they are spending the same effort or more effort, which is going to cost 
even more, but have less product to sell, or the quality of the product has 
diminished because the fish are smaller, which means they are going to get less 
money for that fish. 
This increased effort then increased overfishing: 
 
 Overfishing causes catches to decline, but it’s a vicious cycle because as catches 
 decline you have more effort to still maintain your catches, so as catches decline  
 overfishing increases. And this type of overfishing is even more dangerous,  
 because you are more likely to be catching, smaller, younger fish which will first,  
 make it harder for the stock to reproduce and maintain its population, and second, 
 which will generate less profit. 
 Drivers of overfishing. Despite the narrowing profit margins, participants 
described two main mechanisms perpetuating overfishing. Foremost, primarily in 
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developed countries, consumer demand increased overfishing. Participants explained that 
the increased consumer demand was a more recent phenomenon and driven by the 
portrayal of seafood’s wholesomeness (e.g., its health benefits and that it is more humane 
than other animal protein sources), relative inexpensiveness, and product diversity. 
Unlike other agricultural activities, when demand increased overfishing and fishing 
effort, profits decreased because “at some point the total cost needed to sustain the 
activity exceeds the revenue earned from the product because you are not growing your 
product, you are exploiting a naturally occurring resource.” As a result, one participant 
noted: 
Consumers have a degree of responsibility for overfishing because we leverage 
power over the price of the product. We want cheaper and cheaper seafood 
delivered en masse, and the price we are willing to pay for it is not reflective of 
the true cost of labor production, but because of the diversity of choices, we as 
consumers can keep the cost low, and our disconnect from how fish get from the 
ocean to our plates—that is we can’t see the activity like we see, say farming—
increases our consumer demands while helping us ignore the true cost of 
production.   
Another participant, who identified as a former or current fisher, also added: 
 
 It feels like the fishing industry is just out of options. No one knows what to do. If 
 we try and raise the cost of a fish, consumers just won’t buy it. So then we are  
 forced to lower the price again. And now there are even more types of fish that 
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people are eating. And of course, environmentalists and their organizations are 
wanting people to eat all different types of fish that are more sustainable. Which 
makes sense, but no one is considering the consequences of these actions on those 
of us in the industry. Eating other types of fish may lead to importing more fish, 
which further burdens our local industry by reducing our profits even more. 
Participants also described a series of cause and effects that started with consumer 
demand and ended with IUU fishing. While they described commercial demand for fish 
as expanding throughout the sector, the demand was greatest for cheap fish, which when 
coupled with product diversity, kept consumer costs down. However, “the market still 
demands consistent quality and size so you have to fish farther and deeper, dump your 
catches, and fish illegally.” The illegally caught fish then “flooded the market with cheap 
product” perpetuating a cycle wherein “some fish prices, like canned tuna, haven’t 
changed in over 30 years.” Therefore, IUU was labeled as a financially motivated 
response, and “an effort to maximize profits.” 
In developing countries, consumer demand also existed, driven by growing 
populations and a lack of alternative food sources. However, most participants described 
overfishing in developing countries’ territorial waters being caused by either IUU or 
“legal” overfishing through “licensing schemes.” Most of these developing countries had 
small and underdeveloped economies, which disproportionately relied on fishing to 
support impoverished populations. Lacking the infrastructure to store and transport fish 
within the country though, selling fishing licenses to foreign countries was “a substantial 
and much-needed source of income to support development.” As a result, these licensing 
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schemes created an increased fishing capacity, where “too many boats are fishing for too 
few fish,” thus increasing overfishing. 
These two mechanisms intersected when fish consumption in primarily the United 
States, the European Union countries, and China became too great and grew too fast. This 
increased consumer demand led vessels that had already overexploited their own stocks 
in their territorial waters to look for new areas to fish, which is when developing 
countries’ territorial waters became a target. Participants described these waters as 
historically resource rich and less exploited since the local communities lacked the 
capacity. The arrival of foreign fleets thus increased fishing capacity to the point of 
overfishing. As articulated by participants: 
In a lot of developed countries where there is high demand for cheap seafood, the 
coastal waters do not have productive enough fisheries to satisfy demand anymore 
because they’ve already been overfished, so then these countries’ fishing fleets go 
fish in other, poorer, countries’ territorial waters. 
 
You also have huge power differences between these developed and developing 
countries. The vessels’ countries are rich and powerful, and these poorer countries 
are still developing their economies and many are extremely desperate so they 
will take the money being offered for licenses regardless of environmental 
regulations. There are lots of agreements about fishing licenses that happen in 
secrecy. But the amount of money these developed countries, primarily western 
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countries and China offer, it’s a lucrative cash source for these very poor 
countries. 
The race to fish—defined by participants as a profit-driven fishing motivation, 
versus tradition or subsistence, that is rooted in capitalism and that creates extreme global 
competition for scare fish resources—also increased fish stock declines and IUU fishing, 
and was identified by participants as the reason that the fishing industry often increased 
effort instead of reducing capacity when stocks declined. Not only did the race to fish 
perpetuate overfishing, but participants also linked it to the power differentials and 
exploitation described between developed and developing countries. The race to fish 
compounded increases in IUU fishing caused by regulatory problems and challenges, 
because countries such as China and Thailand “preyed upon” the poorest of developing 
countries’ waters because they “knew that they were out of reach of authorities and that 
the developing countries lacked the capacity to enforce their own environmental 
regulations, thus reducing their risk.” 
 Forced labor slavery as a response to decreasing profits. When fish stocks 
declined and effort increased, reducing profit margins, owners of fishing companies and 
captains of fishing vessels sought ways to cut costs and increase profits. IUU fishing was 
one such strategy, which is why participants noted that decreased profit margins 
increased IUU fishing. Per participants, this is also why decreased profit margins 
increased forced labor slavery—because “cutting labor costs is an attempt to protect 
profits.” Overall there was a lack of control over production, and few fixed costs. “Unlike 
other agricultural activities, there is no investment in the commodity itself—the fish.” 
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And one of the only other competitive advantages would be investment in new 
technologies and equipment. However, most participants reported that in comparison to 
using forced labor, technology was perceived as an expensive, long-term investment; 
whereas, using forced labor slavery was a quick and inexpensive solution. Further, 
fishing operations in general were described as labor-intensive, with crew wages typically 
the largest cost—constituting 40-50% of operating costs when paid fairly. The use of 
forced labor slavery then increased profit margins, reinforcing the use of forced labor to 
offset increasing costs. As detailed by a participant identifying as a former or current 
fisher: 
When fishing effort increases, your costs also increase, which leads to more labor 
abuses such as withheld wages. All of the other stuff like the shootings and the 
beatings is to keep power over them so they can continue to withhold wages. So 
then when your abuses increase, your cost-per-unit of effort decreases, which 
means you are reducing your cost pressures which are threatening your profit. 
The multitude of labor abuses detailed by participants included: misleading contracts; 
bonded debt; wage theft; a lack of overtime pay; payments amounting to less than 
minimum wage; dangerous working conditions and a lack of safety equipment; threats to 
report to immigration officials; no access to healthcare after suffering injuries or illness 
spurred by working conditions; at sea for years at a time and contact with family 
forbidden; inadequate housing on the vessel including living quarters that lacked 
electricity and sanitation consistent with humanitarian standards; unfree to leave boat 
when docked; food and water withheld; immigration and employment papers confiscated, 
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imprisoned in cages and other sub-humanitarian apparatuses; tricked onto vessel; 
kidnapped; working for more than 24 hours without sleep and other forms of extreme 
sleep deprivation; threats to family; forced use of drugs (i.e., amphetamines to stay awake 
and work all night); false promises and a failure to honor commitments in contract; and 
murder. 
 Related cost-cutting measures. Of the other strategies participants described as 
being employed to offset decreasing revenue and increasing costs, many were related to 
forced labor slavery. For example, participants disclosed that IUU fishing and decreasing 
profit margins decreased safety and that subsequently decreased safety increased forced 
labor slavery, with participants characterizing disregard for crew safety as a precursor to 
more egregious labor abuses. 
 When the vessels are generating less profits, they have less money to invest in 
 maintenance and repairs and safety equipment, which contributes to the unsafe  
 and inhumane working conditions that constitute forced labor. 
Transshipment, when fishing vessels tie up to reefer or mother ships in the middle 
of the ocean to refuel and unload fish catch to prevent coming to port for supplies or 
catch unloading, was also described as increasing profit margins because it reduced fuel 
costs and the time needed to traverse between open, international waters and shore. While 
purportedly posited by some in the sector as a strategy for improving fishing efficiency, 
participants suggested that it increased IUU because it allowed legally caught fish to be 
“mixed” with illegally-caught fish rendering traceability impossible, and decreasing the 
risk of getting caught illegally fishing. It also increased forced labor slavery because crew 
 
91 
were being traded at sea to other vessels without their consent, keeping some crew 
members at sea for up to a decade. By keeping crew at sea, hidden from authorities and 
assistive services, users of forced labor slavery again reduced their risk of being caught. 
Disposable vessels were also identified as increasing profit margins (because they 
reduced costs) and increased forced labor slavery. IUU fishing also increased the use of 
disposable vessels. As summarized by a participant: 
One reason that both IUU and forced labor slavery are appealing as ways to  
reduce costs, are that because even though these illegal activities are already low  
risk of getting caught because of regulatory challenges, they essentially become 
even less risk, or minimal, or zero risk because they will often use old vessels that 
are poorly maintained and lack more advanced technology. These vessels are 
cheaper up front, already reducing costs, but they are then essentially disposable. 
They lack safety equipment, etc. Anything that would drive up the cost, it would 
lack, because the idea is that you want this boat and equipment to be disposable 
should you get caught illegally fishing or using illegal labor, or both. And they do. 
They do abandon boats. They even abandon boats with crew on them. And of 
course the crew was forced labor, because again to lower your risk you don’t want 
to invest money into crew just like you don’t want to invest in technology. Your 
crew also needs to be disposable. 
Indeed, six out of 44 (13.6%) participants had direct contact with forced labor slavery 
victims that had been stranded at sea when the captain abandoned the vessel either after 
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getting caught illegally fishing or using forced labor slavery, or was under the imminent 
threat of getting caught. 
 One of the most prevalent tactics expressed by participants for decreasing costs 
within the industry was the use of foreign and migrant laborers, often undocumented, as 
crew members. In delineating how migrant workers increased profit margins, one 
participant recounted: 
 They can pay them [migrant workers] less money than others, and they are  
 typically willing to stay in these jobs for several years because they have no other  
 alternative employment opportunities. 
And while using migrant labor may be so ubiquitous that it no longer supplies a 
competitive advantage, “using local labor is perceived as making you less competitive in 
the global market—especially for large corporations—because you have to pay them 
higher wages.” Compounding this issue was what some participants described as a more 
readily available and mobile supply of migrant workers, whose mere “presence [in the 
sector] discouraged them [companies and boat owners and captains] from investing in 
technological solutions to increase labor productivity and efficiency as a means of 
reducing costs and/or increasing revenues.” 
 Participants also outlined a series of events wherein government subsidies 
increased profit margins by lowering fishing costs and thus “delaying the tipping point of 
when fishing becomes unprofitable.” And the reason why subsidies were even being used 




Now you have this unprecedented international competition in the race to fish,  
 that was really caused by all these countries overfishing their own waters. But  
 because the fuel and just getting to these international waters are so expensive,  
 subsidies are one of the only reasons they can afford to fish in these waters. But  
 these subsidies are just delaying the inevitable, which is why you still have the  
 use of other cost-cutting measures such as the use of forced labor.  
 Axes of structural inequalities. While all the aforementioned measures, including 
forced labor slavery were rationalized as economically justifiable actions in a 
competitive, globalized industry, participants also detailed various systemic structures 
supporting this rationalization. For example, when fishing effort increased, labor 
shortages also increased. 
With just regular effort, fishing is already one of the most labor intensive, hardest,  
jobs there is, and one of the most dangerous. Everyone knows this. No one wants 
these jobs. But then when fishing effort increases because of dwindling stocks, 
fishing becomes an even less desirable job. Which means you can’t find laborers 
who voluntarily want to enter the fishing workforce. So you have an increased 
demand for labor because you need more crew to fish the longer distances, the 
longer hours, to cast the nets more, but you have a dwindling pool of laborers. So  
 you have to get them any way you can, which often means trafficking them or   
 tricking them onto the boat, and then you get the abuses.  




Most crew are foreign (either immigrants or undocumented migrants). Low 
unemployment rates in the ports [of developed countries] means that even low-
skilled workers can bypass fishing crew jobs. The only ones who cannot are often 
the undocumented migrants or a few immigrants… because of barriers they 
cannot obtain better employment. They take the jobs that no one else will take… 
Most citizens, non-migrant, non-immigrants don’t want this kind of job because 
working conditions are unsafe, hazardous, and very difficult and the pay is low. 
Regardless of whether they identified a link between fish stock declines and forced labor 
slavery, all 20 participants, whose organizational focus was either labor and human rights 
or immigration and  migration included the use of foreign and migrant laborers, often 
undocumented, increasing forced labor slavery in their concept maps, and reiterated that 
the empirical data has long supported irregular migration as one of the primary risk 
factors for the use of forced labor slavery in the fishing industry, as it creates a vulnerable 
supply of laborers in sectors where “inequities between race and citizenship status 
maintain long-existing power hierarchies.” This finding was also consistent across all 
regional foci.  
With increased globalization we are seeing more migration than ever before, 
including more irregular migration. But nationalistic, isolation policies are 
making migration more difficult, so now you have larger, irregular (often 





 These participants expanded upon this relationship, describing how the use of 
foreign and migrant workers, often undocumented, increased discrimination from 
nationalism, racism, and xenophobia—with these laborers perceived as “stealing jobs” 
despite most citizens not wanting to work in the fishing sector.  This discrimination in 
turn increased forced labor slavery because it made labor abuses against foreign, migrant, 
and undocumented workers not only economically justified but also “socially acceptable 
so you see a lack of shame on part of the perpetrators.”  
But the [labor] abuses stem from racism. Racism and xenophobia is the bubble  
that this relationship [fish stock declines and slavery] should be nested in. 
 
Labor abuses are socially acceptable because there is such a poor opinion, like  
hostilities and racism towards migrants and immigrants. This isn’t just in  
Thailand. It’s any country that is wealthier than the countries where their migrant 
labor force comes from—which is most. You see it in the US and the EU and UK 
too. So we supposedly want to help victims, but first and foremost we want to 
criminalize “illegal” working through detention, deportation etc. And because of 
misrepresentations of modern slavery in the media, most people in these more 
developed or developed countries think that “illegal” or undocumented work is a 
much bigger issue than forced labor or slavery so that gets priority. 
Additionally, political instability and discrimination increased social vulnerabilities, 
defined by participants as the inability of people to withstand adverse impacts from 
multiple stressors (e.g., exclusionary attitudes that impact employment opportunities). 
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These impacts are due in part to discriminatory characteristics inherent in social 
interactions, institutions, and cultural values. But foremost, political instabilities were 
portrayed as a frequent impetus for migration, but then being a migrant increased a 
person’s social vulnerability because of discrimination. Examples of social vulnerabilities 
that increased migrant worker’s risk for exploitation included high rates of poverty and 
unemployment, language barriers, education disparities and low literacy rates, and a lack 
of support systems. This discrimination also increased government inaction, which 
participants defined as “complicit regulatory bodies” hampered by “pervasive corruption” 
wherein officials are “paid to look the other way and not ask questions because of the 
powerful, vested interests that benefit from the trade” and/or “complacency.” In a domino 
effect, the government inaction then increased regulatory problems and challenges for 
curbing the use of forced labor slavery because it resulted in a lack of initiative to address 
regulatory failures and loopholes. As a result, this government inaction increased the use 
of forced labor slavery (versus other cost-cutting measures) because it lowered the risks 
associated with using forced labor slavery. 
The antipathy towards migrants from neighboring states means there are fewer  
social inhibitions about treating migrant laborers poorly, which also means that 
most, including government officials, police, immigration authorities, etc. fail to 
see anything criminally, culturally, or socially wrong with the use of forced labor 




You have people—company owners, captains—who just won’t follow the rules 
and there are no repercussion for them because governments are complicit. So 
they just don’t follow the rules. Take for example new regulations requiring bank-
to-bank transfers for fishermen’s wages. Oh, but these rules aren’t enforced 
because of the inequalities created by racism—so these poor fishermen can’t 
access bank services. So then there is still the presence of a middleman or 
recruiter or agent who is going to supposedly do the bank-to-bank to transfer. 
 
Forced labor is the go-to cost saving strategy because it is VERY low risk. All of 
these social vulnerabilities lack language barriers, legal challenges like the high 
cost of legal assistance and legal status issues if the victim is undocumented, and 
just all the discriminatory attitudes. These factors all add up to make forced labor 
a surprisingly low-risk activity. 
As a result, while the use of foreign and migrant laborers, often undocumented, 
discrimination, social vulnerabilities, government inaction, and regulatory problems and 
challenges were all individually risk factors for forced labor slavery, participants 
described their convergence in the fishing industry to create a supply of extremely 
vulnerable laborers to meet the demand for cheap labor created by the overfishing-
induced fish stock declines. 
 Regulatory problems and challenges. Already described in various pathways 
and relationships, such as regulatory problems and challenges increased overfishing and 
disposable vessels, and discrimination increased regulatory problems and challenges, 
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participants outlined a litany of issues with environmental, human rights, and labor 
regulations. Foremost, participants characterized regulations as siloed in that each 
problem was governed by its own policies that were not concerned with or intersected 
with policies and regulations from interrelated issues. For example, fisheries authorities 
may board a vessel to investigate for IUU fishing, but would likely not assess or question 
the crew concerning labor conditions, because despite the co-occurrence of these 
problems, “most governments consider IUU to only be an environmental crime.” As a 
result, “segregated inspections create an environment for illegal activities to flourish. We 
need to look at safety, labor, and environmental practices together, not separately.” 
Additionally, there were many stages in the recruitment process from when a worker was 
recruited to work on the vessel to the actual abuse, and each of these steps were regulated 
by different laws. And laws could also differ in some countries based on the vessel size. 
This bureaucracy and lack of interconnected policies thus created regulatory loopholes 
that were easily exploited by perpetrators.  
 Similarly, participants chronicled isolated regulatory practices between local, 
regional, and international institutions and governing bodies. On a more micro level, 
participants recounted cases where a lack of cooperation existed amongst relevant 
agencies and departments (again divided by and hyper focused on specific issues), and on 
a more macro level, cooperation between countries and all relevant regional and 
international bodies was also characterized as lacking.  As a result, participants described 
a “distribution of competence” and a “diffusion of responsibility” in which it was unclear 
which agency or country should take the lead, and a lack of data and information sharing 
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between actors. Flags of convenience was the problem most cited by participants as 
exemplifying these issues. Some participants also depicted how this lack of coordination 
resulted in a displacement of the problem versus a real solution.  
These problems happen both in and out of the EEZs. Sometimes one country will  
implement a new regulation, and it may have some success, but in reality you 
have to look at the regional picture, because it likely just displaced the problem to 
another area or another country’s waters. 
Problems with cooperation and enforcement exacerbating one another were 
detailed when participants discussed such international regulations as the Port State 
Measures. In the case of the Port State Measures, intended to reduce IUU fishing, it has 
yet to be universally adopted. As of March 1st, 2018, it was ratified by just 52 countries. 
Participants cautioned that when such measures have not been universally adopted, the 
potential exists to displace the problem instead of solve or address the problem’s root 
causes. 
It is possible that the Port State Measures will create ports of convenience similar  
to flags of convenience. Though it has now finally entered into force, not every 
country with a port is party to the agreement. We already see the use of these 
ports of convenience and I suspect this practice will increase and vessels engaging 
in IUU will use these ports of convenience that are in countries that are not part of 
the agreement. There is no incentive not too. And to get all countries to agree to 
the measure you would likely have to dilute its regulations to such an extent that 
the measure would be futile. 
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Even if the political will existed to develop intersectional regulations, local or 
regional authorities, particularly in developing countries, would likely lack the capacity 
to enforce such progressive measures. For example, in the scenario detailed earlier, where 
authorities may be investigating IUU fishing, the vessel’s crew would likely be 
comprised of foreign or migrant laborers. Consequently, local or regional authorities may 
lack the ability to communicate with crew members based on language differences. This 
lack of capacity was evident in other scenarios recounted by participants, and led to a 
lack of enforcement of regulations and/or weak monitoring of compliance with 
regulations. In particular, geographic remoteness increased regulatory problems and 
challenges because the spatial vastness and distance of fishing fleets was either too 
expensive or technologically unfeasible for monitoring, enforcement, and inspections, 
and thus allowed perpetrators to evade regulatory bodies.  
Moreover, when monitoring and enforcement were effective or successful in 
catching a perpetrator, the penalties for violating regulations were too minimal to deter 
the behavior. In some countries, participants described the fines for illegal fishing to be as 
low as a couple of hundred dollars, or that officials could be bribed for even less money 
than the fine would have been because officials were so poor, and this poverty led to their 
corruption. And in countries where the fines were higher, or there could be the risk of 
arrest and detention, there was an increased use of the disposable vessels previously 
described that could ultimately be abandoned.  
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The other problem is that the risk of getting caught is actually a fairly minimal 
risk. They know how to exploit legal loopholes and gaps so the most that happens 
to them is that the boat may be confiscated and/or they may be fined. 
And in many instances where there were concerns of labor abuses, participants 
recounted crews being aided in obtaining a “nominal fraction” of lost wages and 
repatriated back to their country of origin, despite most of the human rights field 
advocating for criminal prosecution of perpetrators. Similarly, participants delineated 
numerous challenges to prosecution including most governments wanting to treat 
immigration, migration, labor conditions, and environmental crimes as separate issues. 
Because of the “criminalization of migration” stemming from “creeping global 
nationalism,” participants reported that in most countries if the victims were 
undocumented immigrants or migrants, they would “be punished for immigration 
violations first and foremost.” Reinforcing this lack of deterrents, victims were also 
purportedly “afraid to come forward and report labor abuses if they were engaged in IUU 
because they were fearful of being prosecuted or fined for IUU” which often took 
precedent over the labor concerns. Other barriers to using prosecution as a meaningful 
deterrent included the number of jurisdictions because of the number of stages in the 
recruitment process and supply chain already described, and that in most countries, labor 
abuses were interpreted as employment not criminal matters. This interpretation often 
resulted in cases being sent to civil courts not criminal courts, placing the burden of proof 




Pursuing legal action often places the burden on the victim. There are huge  
 language barriers, lack of legal services, and it can be costly for victims because  
 they may need to stay in the country where they were victimized, but if they were  
 already here undocumented, then they can’t work and they already likely just  
worked without wages, so earning income is their highest priority. 
Further, when both IUU and forced labor cases were sent to criminal courts, participants 
noted the “threshold for what constitutes hard evidence is really high.” This high 
threshold then became unrealistic and was further compounded by a lack of hard 
evidence because many captains and boat owners did not keep log books or they falsified 
them. And when circumstantial evidence was admitted, most cases ended in an acquittal 
of the perpetrator because discrimination against foreigners resulted in owners and 
captains being, “more credible than complaining migrants.”  
But when we find victims, because they are foreigners, they are treated first and 
foremost like criminals by immigration officers. It is very hard for us to get them 
services because of this. And I think this plays off the long history of racism in 
this country. Prosecution is out of the question. Often the men have no evidence 
but each other. There are language barriers. The crews we see are often mixed, 
and the captain fosters racism and animosity between them, so they will not help 
each other. And the victims are given contracts that say all of these abuses are 
permissible. So the victims lack evidence. But it is forced labor because these 




As a result, the consequences for illegal fishing and/or the use of forced labor, 
compounded by the lack of monitoring and enforcement failed to provide meaningful 
deterrents that increased the risk associated with these illegal activities. Thus, 
perpetrators of both environmental and labor crimes frequently changed their vessel 
name, registration, flag country, and disabled their automatic identification system to 
subvert regulations with “no fear of the law.”  
All these countries can really do is fine them, and fines are not a deterrent. IUU, 
trafficking, these are economically rational decisions for these boat owners and 
captains. The risk is worth the reward.  
Furthermore, as previously detailed, discrimination increased regulatory problems 
and challenges in that labor issues were not a priority for officials because victims of 
forced labor slavery were not citizens. Magnifying this relationship were reports that 
most countries’ labor laws do not apply to persons who are not citizens and do not step 
foot on land. Therefore, these regulatory problems and challenges increased 
transshipment since transshipment kept victims at sea, and thus uncovered by labor 
protections. And transshipment itself was not an illegal activity. As a result, some 
participants depicted these regulations as legitimizing exploitation.  
Laws prevent them [victims] for getting help, or from leaving the situation. There 
are currently loopholes in most developed countries’ laws, so the country where 
they are docked, is not responsible for human rights violations against foreign 
workers. 9/11 was also a factor. After that, countries wanting to trade with the US 
had to increase security. For example, putting up fencing around a port. That 
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keeps the fishermen out and isolates them from getting help. And with the more 
recent crackdowns on immigration, and isolationism it is even worse. In many 
countries immigration and border control authorities refuse every fisherman’s 
landing permit so they are not allowed to set foot on soil, and instead are kept on 
vessels. And if fisheries inspectors board the vessel, they are not responsible for 
checking on crew welfare. Not only does this limit any opportunities a fisherman 
may have to report bad conditions and make complaints, but it also means that the 
fishermen are not protected by that country’s labor laws despite being in that 
country’s waters. And if a captain has confiscated the victim’s papers [i.e., 
passport] the situation is even more dire. It is legal impunity.  
Other regulatory problems and challenges outlined by participants included 
lobbying efforts by the tuna industry in developed countries, particularly the United 
States, that influenced the creation (or absence thereof) of cooperative fishing 
regulations. And some participants from North America and Europe portrayed newer 
regulations as institutionalizing labor exploitation.  
There is also a legislative loophole that allows Hawaiian fleets to employ men 
from impoverished Southeast Asian and Pacific countries for a fraction of the cost 
they would have to pay American workers. It is a law that grants fishing licenses. 
So this law encourages fishing vessel captains to use foreign labor because it is 
cheaper and it allows them to pay foreign crew below minimum wage, but the 
same law prevents these fishermen from leaving the vessels. It legitimizes the 




Supply chain complexities. Participants portrayed the seafood supply chain as 
one of the most complex of any commodity due to the sheer number of steps in the chain, 
the number of times fish are aggregated, the geographic coverage (labeled as geographic 
remoteness increased supply chain complexity), and the length of time (seafood can 
remain in the chain for up to one year) from when a fish was harvested from the ocean to 
when it appeared on a plate. As such, participants reported this supply chain complexity 
increased consumer disconnect in that it was difficult for consumers to know if their fish 
products were ethically sourced and sustainably fished. In developed countries, 
consumers often relied on seafood certification schemes to better educate themselves and 
make informed choices as consumers; however, a recent inundation of these schemes into 
markets resulted in a lack of transparency and consistency that threatened their quality 
and their ability to appropriately inform consumer choices. Additionally, the consumer 
preference in developed countries to eat just fish filets made the chain more complex as 
whole fish were easier to trace and harder to fraudulently label. Due to the overwhelming 
nature of this supply chain complexity, government inaction also increased. Because 
transshipment mixed legally and illegally caught fish out of sight of authorities, it 
increased supply chain complexity by hindering traceability initiatives, which then 
increased forced labor slavery (depicted on the consensus map as supply chain 
complexity increased forced labor slavery). Lastly, due to the aforementioned barriers to 
cooperation between agencies and departments and countries and regional and 
international bodies, supply chain complexity also increased regulatory problems and 
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challenges since each step of the chain was likely to occur in a different geographic 
location.  
But of course traceability in such a large, globalized supply chain is incredibly  
hard. The more steps you have, and the more places that those steps happen in, the  
harder traceability becomes. Countries are not going to pay the costs of using  
improved technology for surveillance, particularly poorer countries. Thus the  
private companies are going to have do that. And because consumers are so  
disconnected from the seafood they eat, the pressure from consumers is just not  
there yet to make the private companies invest in this technology.  
Fisheries interventions and regulatory reforms. Participants delineated two 
primary regulatory interventions—the implementation of marine protected areas (MPAs) 
and catch shares/quota systems—in response to declining stocks, overfishing, and IUU 
fishing (depicted as fish stock declines increase fishery interventions and regulatory 
reforms). Marine protected areas are swaths of the ocean with defined boundaries, that 
are designated as protected akin to a terrestrial protected area or national park. MPAs 
differ considerably in regards to their restrictions (no, limited, or highly regulated fishing, 
harvesting, boating, and tourism activities), enforcement, and size, and are more likely to 
be located in territorial waters versus the high seas. Catch shares or catch quotas are a 
managerial regulation in which the total catch limit for the year is established, and then 
each licensed fisherman and/or vessel is granted a percentage or portion of the 
established total allowable catch, typically through a fishing license.  
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While typically lauded by environmentalists and ocean conservationists, eight 
(25%) of the 32 participants who linked fish stock declines and forced labor slavery also 
reported fisheries interventions and regulatory reforms increased forced labor slavery. 
Though there are tensions resulting from a conflict of interests between regulating 
authorities and fishing communities about policies and interventions, only two of the 
eight participants who identified this relationship were current or former fishers. Overall, 
participants characterized some environmental policy interventions to reduce overfishing 
as not considering the social justice and human dimensions of the problem and proposed 
solution, particularly in non-coastal waters.  
In particular, participants suggested MPAs lacking enforcement mechanisms 
increased the problem of forced labor slavery on fishing vessels because they created 
areas of more abundant fish stocks while simultaneously expelling legal fishers who may 
informally police an area against illegal activities.  
 Protected areas are difficult to enforce. And most law abiding boats will stay out 
 of the area, so now you don’t have that natural accountability within the fishing  
community. You don’t have the presence of these other boats to deter or report 
illegal activities. And then boats illegally fishing target these reserves because  
they know that fish are more abundant in these areas, and enforcement is almost  
non-existent. 
As a result, MPAs reduced the risk of detection when using forced labor slavery while 
increasing the reward—more fish for a greater profit—with one participant reporting, 
“the probability of being detected using forced labor in a MPA is near zero. If you are 
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most likely to see forced labor with high profits and low risk of detection, bingo! That’s a 
MPA.” These participants also posited that increased forced labor slavery as a response to 
MPA implementation was most likely to occur when MPAs were “haphazardly 
implemented in a kneejerk response to drastic declines, public outcry, or intense scientific 
pressure.”  
A lot of them were implemented too quickly and as a result are poorly  
implemented and not really enforced. Their initial goal was to protect the  
ecosystem and the fish, but I don’t think they considered the socioeconomic  
consequences on fishermen and fishing companies at all. So now you have  
negative outcomes for both the fish and the fishermen. To be honest, they have  
done more bad than good. 
 
There was a rush to create MPAs because of the Sustainable Development Goals.  
But most of these MPAs lack enforcement because either that wasn’t part of their   
implementation, or they were established in areas that lack the capacity to enforce  
them and there were no assistance funds disseminated to help with enforcement  
capacity. Without the enforcement, the low risk of using forced labor in general is 
now even riskier. 
Alternatively, where MPAs had some enforcement mechanisms, their existence 
increased fishing effort (e.g., fishing longer, farther, and deeper to circumvent the 
protected area), thus increasing costs and decreasing profit margins and further justifying 
the use of forced labor slavery as an economically rational decision to maximize profits 
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even on “legal” and registered vessels. This increased effort and cost also marginalized 
small-scale fishing operations. For vessels and companies that did not resort to using 
forced labor slavery as a cost-cutting measure, many became financially overwhelmed 
and left the sector, consolidating power and capital in industrial operations more prone to 
using forced labor.  
Similarly, catch shares implemented “haphazardly without careful consideration 
of the socio-economic consequences” (i.e., those lacking measures to prevent quota 
accumulation) were also detailed as increasing the marginalization of small-scale 
fisheries in that “they crippled the profitability of the sector by making fishing more 
expensive.” As chronicled by participants, because distributed quotas or shares were 
based on historical landings, small-scale fishermen were not given a large enough share 
to make their fishing effort profitable. Also, other measures, such as the use of observers 
on board vessels to ensure compliance with regulations, resulted in additional expenses 
incurred by the vessel owner and/or fishing captain (i.e., fisheries interventions and 
regulatory reforms decreased profit margins). Further, some participants viewed the 
system as rewarding illegal behavior, by giving larger shares to fishermen and companies 
that had inflated their previous landings with illegal catch. Then when fishing was no 
longer profitable for small-scale fishers, they sold their quotas to larger competitors who 
had previously used illegal activity to gain a competitive advantage and were now 
rewarded with a “monopolization of the market” (described on the map as 
marginalization of small-scale fishers increases monopolization of resources) because 
there were no appropriate consolidation caps to prevent the accumulation of shares.  
 
110 
So what happened was that it [catch share system] essentially privatized open 
access fisheries. The small-scale fishermen had no choice but to sell their sliver of 
quotas to larger competitors, because they could not catch enough fish under their 
quotas to make a profit. More medium-scale commercial fishers “rented” quotas 
from larger-scale commercial fishers who leased out their quotas. So if you are 
talking about labor and slavery issues, I would say it was comparably to 
sharecropping. They basically pay these exorbitant fees/rents just for the right to 
do the work, that is often the only work they know how to do.  
The result of these systems was the consolidation, concentration, and accumulation of 
power and capital in the hands of a few “sea lords” at the expense of many small-scale 
fishers. Of note, the implementation of ineffective fisheries interventions and regulatory 
reforms was not the only driver of this marginalization. Fish stock declines and IUU 
fishing, which was perceived as providing a competitive advantage, also increased the 
marginalization of small-scale fishers. 
 Stock declines wipe out small-scale fishing operations in general because these  
guys have really small profit windows to begin with, and it doesn’t take much to 
collapse it and for them to end up losing money. This results in further 
consolidation of power. It is like get big or get out. And they lack the capacity to 





Most of the vessels that were lost during the rapid stock declines were small-scale 
commercial fishing vessels. The number of boats just declined because fishing 
was no longer economically viable. In a three-year span, the average cost of a trip 
doubled. 
Once this marginalization of small-scale operations caused fishers to exit the 
industry, participants relayed multiple chain reactions. First, marginalization increased 
IUU fishing in that those that did not fold their operations were more likely to illegally 
fish by catching more fish or different fish than their share allowed, or high grading their 
fish amongst other illegal activities. Marginalization also increased other transnational 
crimes and wildlife crimes because collapsed small-scale fishers still possessed boats that 
were not being used. Therefore, participants shared reports of former fishers getting paid 
by transnational criminal syndicates to use their boats to smuggle and traffick people, 
drugs, and illegal wildlife across maritime borders because “they have this resource [the 
boat], and see it [smuggling] as the only opportunity to earn income with this resource 
they likely accrued debt for.”  
For transnational criminal syndicates, fishing vessels are ideal receptacles for all  
kinds of illegal activity because they are so poorly regulated, and when they are  
regulated there is limited enforcement. Add onto that, the crippling of the sector 
from fish stock declines, stagnant market prices of fish, and increasingly 
expensive regulatory reforms you end up with hundreds of small-scale fishermen 





This desperation to generate income by any means was also highlighted by participants 
describing the monopolization of resources that resulted from marginalization as 
increasing social vulnerabilities, particularly poverty and unemployment, that are then 
risk factors for becoming a victim of forced labor slavery. “This elimination of small-
scale operations is often in places that are already socio-economically depressed, so you 
have really desperate people.”  
So now you have fewer fish, increasing competition, and a consolidation of power 
because quotas are being purchased by the same foreign companies and pushing 
small-scale operations in poorer countries out. So quotas initially based on 
history, but if a later generation cannot use it or sells it out of desperation because 
they were too small to be profitable because of the fish stock issues, it’s almost 
impossible for them to ever get it back. And these foreign countries prey on these 
small-scale fishermen knowing they are desperate for the cash. In response, some 
countries have made laws that so many crew members have to be local, to give 
locals, especially small-scale fishermen squeezed out, work. But they become 
vulnerable because [they] don’t speak the same language and cannot 
communicate with other crew, captain, etc.  
Further, the intersection of power consolidation and resource monopolization, in the 
context of an industry where discrimination and inequities are deeply rooted, created 
power differences that led to and normalized forced labor slavery. 
Labor abuses happen to fishermen all over the world. Doesn’t matter if you are 
black, white, brown, green, or purple, if there are any inequities between you and 
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the boat owner and/or captain, you are at risk. Could be that your religion is 
different, or your skin color or language. It doesn’t matter. Could be anything. But 
it is really the inequitable access to fish and the consolidation of power that gives 
the abusers their power. The other things [e.g., physical violence, threats, wage 
withholding, etc.], the abusers just use these other things to keep their power. 
Moreover, one participant who identified as a current or former fisher, described a 
sector management system under their catch share program that they perceived as 
institutionalizing IUU fishing and normalizing labor abuses. The participant recounted 
that they had been in the sector long enough to remember when fishers were organized 
under unions, which provided some social protections. However, unions were now rare, 
and to help promote social organization, sector management systems were implemented 
to help fishers self-organize. At the same time, the leaders of these micro-organizations 
were also intended to be responsible for informal policing of the vessels under the sector 
organization; however, this participant noted that frequently the person with the most 
power led the organization, and this person’s power was often derived from illegal 
activity (depicted on the map as fisheries interventions and regulatory reforms increased 
IUU fishing). Thus, corruption allowed labor abuses and illegal fishing to flourish with 
impunity.  
Because even catch shares are difficult to enforce, because you know people can  
fraudulently label their fish, they can mix illegally caught and legally caught fish,  
they can high-grade their fish, etc. We still don’t have good ways to enforce this.  
So because there is no enforcement, or limited enforcement, or in some instances  
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inequitable enforcement where small-scale fishermen’s catch are more closely 
monitored than industrial fishing because the small-scale fishermen are closer to  
shore, thus it does not require as much capacity. I’ve heard a lot of fishermen say  
that the criminals are in charge of the enforcement under sector management. 
 Forced labor slavery’s contributions to environmental degradation. 
Conversely, participants also identified forced labor slavery as a driver of pressures on 
fish stocks including increasing overfishing and IUU fishing. Specific to IUU fishing, 
using forced labor slavery reduced the risk of getting caught since most victims were 
undocumented migrants and immigrants who “kept silent” and “were afraid to be snitches 
out of fear that they would be deported if they reported the illegal activities their vessels 
were engaged in,” which is consistent with participant descriptions of immigration and 
migration violations being perceived as more pressing than environmental and labor 
crimes. Regarding forced labor slavery increasing overfishing, participants depicted 
slavery as functioning like a subsidy that sustains overfishing and intensification of effort 
despite negative economic feedbacks. Slavery allowed company owners and vessel 
captains to increase effort, and potentially harvest more fish, without increasing costs. 
As a result the tipping point where it becomes uneconomical to fish more is 
pushed down the track. So you can keep fishing more and longer. So then this 
modern slavery also contributes to increased fishing pressures, because when your 
cost-per-unit effort decreases, you are going to increase your effort even further to 
make as much money as possible. Slavery functions like a subsidy. Exploiting 
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workers temporarily increases profitability, but in the long-term the overfishing 
caused by it is further diminishing profitability. 
Participants also noted that forced labor slavery increased wildlife crimes, in 
particular, shark finning, trafficking of endangered species, and the illegal harvesting of 
marine species such as sea cucumbers. Some participants shared anecdotes from victims 
wherein shark finning was used as a threat and/or intimidation tactic. For example, 
victims would get thrown overboard and told they would only be rescued if they captured 
a shark. Other participants compared shark finning to IUU, in that in areas where shark 
finning is banned yet shark fins generate high monetary value, enslaved crew members 
are used to harvest the sharks because they will not report the crime when the vessel 
returns to land. This process was comparable for the trafficking of endangered species on 
vessels as well as the illegal harvesting of marine species such as sea cucumbers. 
Case Scenario Executions 
To explore how the system—and in particular forced labor slavery as an 
outcome—might react under a range of possible changes precipitated by interventions 
and/or a lack of action to prevent continued fisheries degradation, case scenario 
executions were performed to achieve aim four. Variables for each case scenario were 
identified based on degree of centrality in the model, meaning they were the most 
connected and/or had the highest absolute values of relationship weightings. For each 
scenario, four iterations were performed—with the increase or decrease strengthening 
each iteration. In total, 10 scenarios were performed. Increases and decrease in fish stock 
declines, overfishing, fishing effort, IUU fishing, and regulatory problems and 
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challenges. Of note, a key assumption for the regulatory scenario was that when 
regulatory problems and challenges were decreased (implying a more unified regulatory 
environment), unintended consequences did not outweigh the benefits of the regulatory 
changes.  
Each scenario’s impact was then evaluated by comparing the relative change in 
forced labor slavery to the baseline, steady state values by using hyperbolic tangents that 
resulted in a range of increases and decrease from -2 to 2 (Figure 13). For fish stock 
declines, fishing effort, and IUU fishing, the impacts on forced labor slavery were greater 
when the mental model variables were increased than when they were decreased. 
However, for regulatory problems and challenges, the absolute value of the change from 
the steady state was larger when the variable was decreased than increased. And for 
overfishing, increasing yielded no changes in forced labor slavery from the steady state.  
When profit margins were manipulated in case scenarios, both the increasing and 
decreasing of the variable yielded increases in forced labor slavery, though the increase in 
forced labor slavery was higher when profit margins decreased. For example, when profit 
margins were decreased by -.25, -.5, -.75, and -1, the subsequent increases in forced labor 
slavery were .01, .02, .02, and .04. Whereas when profit margins were increased -.25, -.5, 











Figure 13. Forced Labor Slavery Mental Model Scenarios 
 
Change from steady state. 
 
Figure 13. Numeric values represent the relative, predicted deviation in forced labor 
slavery from the steady state when pertinent central variables (i.e., mental model 
variables) were manipulated by decreases of -.25 (light blue), -.5 (orange), -.75 (light 
gray), and -1 (yellow) or increases of  .25 (green), .5 (dark blue), .75 (brown), and 1  
(dark gray). Changes from the steady state range on a scale of -2 to 2. All mental  
model variables were positively associated with forced labor slavery, thus increases  
and decreases in all five variables led to increases and decreases respectively in  
forced labor slavery. 
  
 
Since forced labor slavery was the most central variable in the system, it was also 
manipulated to determine its impacts on other system variables in the event that forced 
labor slavery increased (Figure 14) or decreased (Figure 15). If slavery increased, the 
mental models suggested that profit margins and wildlife crimes would incur the greatest 
increases, with fishing safety decreasing. Whereas if slavery decreased, the outcome 
variable with the largest corresponding decrease was IUU fishing. Per the mental model 
scenario, decrease in forced labor slavery could also lead to decreases in profit margins, a 
-1.5 shift from the baseline state.  
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Figure 14. Impacts of Increased Forced Labor Slavery on System Variables 
 
 
Figure 14. The hypothesized changes from the steady state (y-axis) for each system 
variable (x-axis) if forced labor slavery increases, based on the perceived connections 
between variables in the Mental Model scenario. 
 
Though in the middle of the range for centrality, participants also discussed how 
fisheries interventions were having unintended social consequences that could potentially 
be increasing forced labor slavery. As a result another scenario was executed wherein 
fisheries interventions were increased, further decreasing profit margins, which did result 
in an increase of forced labor slavery by a 0.08 shift from the baseline (Figure 16). 
However, when the researcher manipulated the aggregate map by flipping the sign of the 
relationship between fisheries interventions and profit margins, so that an intervention 
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would increase profit margins, the subsequent increase in forced labor slavery was 
reduced to a 0.02 increase from the baseline. 
Figure 15. Impacts of Decreased Forced Labor Slavery on System Variables 
 
Figure 15. The hypothesized changes from the steady state (y-axis) in each system 
variable (x-axis) if forced labor slavery decreases, based on the perceived connections 












Figure 16. Potential Impacts of Fisheries Interventions on Forced Labor Slavery 
 
Figure 16. Predicted changes from forced labor slavery’s steady state (x-axis) if fisheries 
interventions are increased, based on the assumption of participants that fisheries 










Chapter Five: Discussion 
Study Findings 
 Overall, the study found preliminary evidence supporting fish stock declines as a 
driver of forced labor slavery, but that many challenges and barriers exist for 
determining, with greater certainty, the strength of the relationship. Foremost, all 
participants noted a lack of rigorous, longitudinal data for forced labor slavery counts on 
fishing vessels, despite most participants sharing anecdotally that the number of victims 
they were encountering had been steadily increasing since approximately 2008 to 2010. 
Early fish stock declines were first noted in the 1940s (Graham, 1943; Russell, 1942). 
However, the aggregation of study participants’ noted increases in forced labor slavery 
victims on fishing vessels around the same time frame (2008-2010) suggests that: 1) a 
timescale exists wherein there is a lag between when stocks begin to decline and forced 
labor slavery starts to increase, and 2) a tipping point exists in that stock declines have to 
reach a certain threshold of severity, or decline drastically in a short enough time period 
to tip the system and result in forced labor slavery as an outcome.  
 Challenges to estimating forced labor slavery prevalence. Estimating the 
prevalence of forced labor slavery on fishing vessels is further hindered by difficulties in 
identifying victims and understanding what is and what is not forced labor slavery. While 
this is a challenge for all sectors, as one participant noted, “fishing just looks like 
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slavery” in that fishing is consistently one of or the most dangerous profession and even 
non-abused fishers work excessively long hours during hauls, are at sea for several 
months, and earn wages less than standard national minimum wage thresholds. However, 
this sentiment is harmful because it can minimize the experiences of victims; it allows 
non-abused workers in all sectors to appropriate the experiences of those ensnared in 
forced labor slavery; and it likely leads to underestimation of the problem’s prevalence. 
Similarly, in this study the researcher noted even key stakeholders that have worked in 
the field for several years were hesitant to label labor abuses as modern slavery, despite 
the situations they described meeting the criteria for forced labor/modern slavery as 
delineated by the ILO (International Trade Union Confederation & Special Action 
Programme to Combat Forced Labor, ILO, 2008). Instead most participants qualified the 
abuses as “slave-like” or “resembling modern slavery.” This hedging is likely a product 
of outsiders labeling human rights activists and scholars as hyperbolic.  
And then compounding the problem, was the recent CNN investigation which 
uncovered African migrants being sold at an auction in Libya, akin to conceptions of 
historical slavery (2017). However, human rights scholars have affirmed the differences 
between modern and historical slavery for many years now, and that instances of persons 
being sold at auctions are nominal compared to debt bondage and other forms of modern 
slavery (e.g., Bales, 2016). This type of media recognition, though, reinforces a false 
image of what constitutes slavery to the public because it is more consistent with wide-
spread hermeneutics of slavery, making it harder for people outside of the field to believe 
that slavery exists on fishing vessels if victims are not being sold in a public forum.  
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As a result, nuanced understandings of consent are overlooked or not explored, 
resulting in a multitude of legal definitions for forced labor slavery that ignore the crux of 
the issue—informed consent (Bales, 2017). Thus, this habit of not emphasizing and 
understanding consent also makes it difficult to prosecute offenders because when people 
interpret the law, they misconstrue consent, and typically not in the victim’s favor (e.g., 
Saengpassa, 2018). This situation is then further exacerbated by the overwhelming scale 
of the problem, in that so many people and processes are involved in forced labor slavery 
on fishing vessels that no one appears to be accountable. The absence of an offender then 
makes it more difficult to identify a victim for prosecution purposes.  
 Furthermore, because victims are on vessels at sea and thus inaccessible for 
purposes of obtaining victim counts, estimations often rely on victims coming forward 
for purposes of reporting and/or seeking services. However, study participants described 
numerous barriers to victims coming forward including: punishment for undocumented 
migration, IUU fishing, and/or wildlife or transnational crimes; not wanting to lose their 
job out of hopes that they will eventually receive their wages; not wanting to be identified 
as a victim which would be shameful in their culture; not wanting to be “blacklisted” for 
future work; a lack of realization that they are a victim because they too do not 
understand what constitutes modern slavery; a lack of incentives for coming forward 
since wage recovery rarely occurs; and discrimination. As such, these barriers likely lead 
to further underestimation of the problem.  
 Interrelationships and processes. While the study could only provide a cursory 
understanding of the strength of the relationship between fish stock declines and forced 
 
124 
labor slavery, it did yield a clearer understanding of the processes and interrelationships 
that connect these two phenomena. Analyses of the consensus and individual maps 
suggests that key variables confounding the relationship between fish stock declines and 
forced labor slavery are regulatory problems and challenges, fishing effort, profit 
margins, and IUU fishing. Of note, all four of these variables were listed as common 
variables in the individual map analyses as they were included in more than half of the 
participant maps, and all four were in the top six most central variables in the consensus 
map—excluding forced labor slavery. Without better quantitative data, though, it is 
difficult to determine with greater certainty whether each variable functions as a mediator 
or moderator, but the preliminary qualitative data in conjunction with the individual maps 
suggests the following. 
Regulatory problems and challenges may moderate the relationship between fish 
stock declines and forced labor slavery as participants described it as strengthening the 
relationship. Many participants also identified this as a key point of intervention, and 
indeed during case scenario executions the decrease of regulatory problems and 
challenges yielded the highest decrease on forced labor slavery of all scenarios. However, 
when regulatory problems and challenges was increased, it resulted in a nominal increase 
in forced labor slavery suggesting that if it is a moderator, its interactions weaken the 
effects between fish stock declines and forced labor slavery. 
 On the other hand, fishing effort and profit margins may mediate the relationship 
between fish stock declines and forced labor slavery. Describing fishing effort as driving 
declines in profit margins, participants described both of these variables as the impetus 
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for using forced labor slavery as a response to fish stock declines, thus detailing a 
scenario wherein fishing effort and profit margins may explain the relationship. The 
results from the case scenario analyses support this conclusion in that decreases in fishing 
effort caused nominal decreases in forced labor slavery and decreases in profit margins 
still produced increases in forced labor slavery, albeit smaller in value than the increases 
provided by decreasing profit margins. Thus the presence of increased effort and 
declining profit margins may explain the relationship.  
 Though IUU fishing was one of the most common variables in individual maps 
and one of the most central variables in the consensus map, the findings from the case 
scenario executions supported the participants’ ambiguity around its role in the system. 
While other variables such as regulatory problems and challenges and fishing effort had 
nominal impacts on forced labor slavery in one scenario (either increasing or decreasing), 
the impacts in the inverse scenario were substantial. However, IUU fishing had nominal 
influence on forced labor slavery when increased and decreased. Thus, it may be 
impacted by the same factors, processes, and relationships as forced labor slavery, and 
coexist in the system, but it may have less direct influence on forced labor slavery and 
therefore not interact with the relationship between fish stock declines and forced labor 
slavery.  Instead, it may be more important to consider forced labor slavery’s influence 
on IUU fishing. During the qualitative interviews, several participants detailed how using 
forced labor slavery helped vessels engaging in illegal fishing activities keep their 
activities secret or hidden. And as represented in Figure 15, when forced labor decreased, 
IUU fishing had the largest absolute value shift from the baseline of any variable in the 
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mental model (a decrease of 1.82), though when forced labor slavery was increased, it 
only increased by a value of .02.  
 Results from the study also provided tentative empirical support for Bales’ (2016) 
and Brashares et al.’s (2014) hypotheses that while fish stock declines may initiate the 
increase in forced labor slavery in the sector, the system self-perpetuates through 
feedback loops as forced labor slavery increases fishing effort and overfishing, thus 
further declining stocks. Indeed, forced labor slavery was the most central variable in the 
consensus map, suggesting that it has influence over many aspects of the ecological 
system, and not just the social system. In addition, in the mental model scenario 
represented in Figure 15, when forced labor slavery decreased the greatest impacts were 
in the ecological system on IUU fishing (-1.82), overfishing (-1.77) and fish stock 
declines (-1.72).  
 While not as central of a variable to the social system, the role of consumer 
demand was important to individual models. Based on counts of participant models, 
consumer demand was the most frequently identified transmitter variable, reflecting an 
ideology that consumers have the power to change the system. However, during map 
aggregation, other effects on consumer demand, particularly relationships where 
consumer demand was on the receiving end of influences from supply chain complexity 
and consumer disconnect through seafood certification schemes, transposed the variable 
to an ordinary variable. This shift is notable, and may have possible social justice 
implications for consumption.  
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Previous research indicates that persons are willing to pay more for ecologically 
and socially sustainable fish, but that they have difficulty understanding and choosing 
between the discrete and numerous seafood certification schemes, suggesting that these 
schemes are not meeting their education objectives (McClenachan, Dissanayake, & Chen, 
2016). In addition, the trustworthiness of these schemes, due in part to transparency and 
conflict of interest concerns, has recently been questioned by experts (e.g., Webster, 
2016). Since study participants noted that low-value fish (e.g., canned, white albacore 
tuna) are the type of fish most likely to be harvested using forced labor slavery—and 
canned fish is marketed as an inexpensive, nutritious, and high-protein food source for 
low-income and food insecure persons—there should be concern about how time and 
material/financial poverty interact with consumer demand and disconnect. For example, 
“the working poor” may be more inclined to purchase these seafood products since they 
are low-cost and nutritious and because these persons likely lack the privilege of excess 
time to self-educate about the credibility and reliability of seafood certification schemes. 
Thus, there should be cognizance of how this issue is framed by stakeholders, otherwise 
rhetoric could lead to the blaming of poor people’s consumption for unsustainable and 
unjust fisheries practices.  
 Toward a universal theoretical model. Though frequently framed and/or 
presented as a problem in Southeast Asia (e.g., EJF, 2014, 2015a, 2015b; FishWise, 
2014), the data presented in Figure 10 suggests that forced labor slavery is a global 
problem. Developed countries, like the United States and European Union member states, 
are exploiting legal loopholes that do not require them to provide labor protections to 
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fishers to justify their declarations that there are no victims in their waters or on their 
fleets. Without labor protections, there can be no violations, and therefore no victims. 
However, while the prevalence of the problem could be the highest in Southeast Asia, the 
field is doing an egregious disservice to victims globally, and itself, by hyper focusing on 
Southeast Asia as it minimizes the role developed countries play in perpetuating a 
stagnant regulatory environment. Additionally, the relatively few statistical differences 
between demographically varied groups suggests that a universal framework may be 
useful in guiding future research and interventions in a globalized industry, while using 
specific proxies for each construct to tailor the framework to a specific region or locale.  
 Building upon Figure 1, Figure 17 represents the use of participants’ knowledge 
to refine Figure 1’s social-ecological system components, organization, and their 
interrelationships, achieving the study’s first specific aim. Most of the original 
framework’s contextual constructs, main relationship variables, and interrelationships 
were validated in the study. However, changes from Figure 1 to Figure 17 include: 1) the 
addition of a political context construct intended to represent the national environment’s 
influences on a country’s citizens,  2) collapsing the cultural context into the 
socioeconomic context as participants described discrimination, in particular, as being 
closely related and highly influential to the main relationship, 3) eliminating the variable 
of “demand for cheap labor increases” due to redundancy, and 4) adding arrows to show 
that while contextual constructs influence the main relationship, the main relationship 
also influences the contextual constructs. Table 13 then lists the variables from the 
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consensus map that were not represented in the theoretical framework’s constructs as 
proxies for the contextual constructs. 
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Recommendations for Future Research 
The researcher’s long-term research agenda includes using mixed methods 
research that considers varied and diverse knowledge sources as data—in part, to expand 
beyond the human rights field’s data limitations—to compile a list of evidence-based 
factors that contribute to slavery on fishing vessels and to move from conceptualization 
to quantification of how these factors uniquely contribute to the problem, and how they 
interact with each other to create a supply and demand that allows slavery to persist in the 
fishing sector. As such, the Theory of Fish Stock Declines and Forced Labor Slavery 
framework should be used to guide future empirical testing, and this empirical testing 
should also be used to continue to validate the framework. While FCM provided the next 
step in confirming conceptualization of the linkages, as research about the relationship 
between fish stock declines and forced labor slavery progresses, it should advance along 
the continuum from conceptualization to quantification. As noted on page 34, structural 
equation modeling would likely be the most rigorous approach to quantitatively testing 
the relationship and the end of this continuum. However, this study identified several 
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pathways where better quantitative data is still needed before a SEM approach could be 
undertaken. 
While this dissertation’s analysis of the pertinent constructs and their 
interrelationships that contribute to the links between fish stock declines and forced labor 
slavery corroborated NGO investigations about the importance of IUU fishing; 
transshipment and lack of traceability and transparency due to supply chain complexity; 
the use of undocumented migrant workers; and regulatory gaps in environmental and 
labor laws (EJF, 2015; FishWise, 2014, ILO, 2013a, UNODC, 2013), the emergence of 
environmental policies’ potential contributions to forced labor slavery is a timely and 
pertinent knowledge gap. In addition to this study’s findings represented in Figures 14 
and 15 wherein increases and decreases in forced labor slavery respectively increase and 
decrease IUU fishing, overfishing, and fish stock declines, prior theoretical (Brashares et 
al., 2014) and empirical (Bales, 2016) research suggests the use of forced labor slavery 
could be increasing overfishing. In September 2018, the United Nations will begin two-
and-a-half year negotiations for a new internationally binding high seas treaty under the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea with a goal of strengthening Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations’ catch share/quota systems and more readily establishing 
large-scale marine protected areas on the high seas to curb overfishing in international 
waters and advance greater protections for biodiversity (High Seas Alliance, 2017; UN, 
2017). Without understanding how these environmental measures impact the use of 
forced labor slavery on fishing vessels, these policies may undermine their own 
conservation objectives, thus perpetuating a cycle wherein fish stock declines are a driver 
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of forced labor slavery and use of forced labor slavery is a driver of overfishing-induced 
fish stock declines.  As such, retrospective time-series research designs offer an efficient 
way to better understand the impacts of MPAs and catch share/quota programs on forced 
labor slavery counts in areas where forced labor slavery data is collected via Gallup-style 
polls.  
Considering the ambiguity and unclear findings around the connections between 
forced labor slavery and IUU fishing, this relationship also needs to be explored and 
explained further. Along with obtaining counts of the number of “disposable vessels,” 
these are areas where the human rights/slavery field can and should apply innovative and 
emergent technologies such as the use of drones. Though some NGOs have started using 
satellite data obtained from vessel automated identification systems (AIS) to identify 
vessels that have “gone dark” or turned off their AIS to engage in illegal activity without 
being tracked (e.g., FAO, 2017b; Malarky & Lowell, 2018), the scale of the problem and 
data needed may be too great to effectively or efficiently use this type of data as it 
requires mining billions of satellite transmissions and then closely studying patterns to 
ascertain if a ship is “going dark” for illegitimate or legitimate reasons. “Going dark” is 
legal under certain circumstances, most notably, to evade pirates in dangerous waters. 
The use of drones may also be able to provide more reliable and valid data since the 
control over data collection will belong to researchers instead of relying on vessel 
compliance, which is known to be problematic. 
Additionally, wildlife crime was only included in six participant maps. However, 
in all six maps, the variable functioned as a receiver of the effects from forced labor 
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slavery. When the individual maps were aggregated, the relationship strength was 
maintained, suggesting reliability amongst these six participants in how they viewed 
forced labor slavery impacting wildlife crimes. Though a multitude of studies have 
explored the socio-cultural and economic drivers of wildlife crimes (e.g., Challender & 
MacMillan, 2014; Duffy, St. John, Büscher, & Brockington, 2016), there has not yet been 
an exploration into how social conflicts, like forced labor slavery, may help facilitate the 
processes of these crimes. Since wildlife crimes are a major threat to biodiversity loss 
(Sodhi, Koh, Brook, & Ng, 2004), this is another emergent pathway that should be 
prioritized for future research.  
Study Implications  
Findings from this dissertation suggest a need for transdisciplinary research to 
inform intersectional and holistic policies in order to produce more cost-effective policy-
based interventions, waste less fiscal resources on interventions that are producing 
unintended consequences that undermine the intervention rather than mitigate the 
problem, and a reduction in both fish stock pressures and forced labor slavery victims on 
fishing vessels. To date, the social justice and human dimensions of environmental policy 
interventions to reduce overfishing are often not considered in non-coastal waters.(De 
Santo, 2013; Gruby, Gray, Campbell, & Acton, 2016). With the upcoming negotiations of 
the new high seas treaty, this could provide an opportunity to begin to address fish stock 
pressures and declines and slavery under the same, unified regulations. However, the 
same model also needs to be replicated at regional, national, and subnational levels. As 
noted by participants during their interviews, if holistic regulations are implemented, then 
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reverberations occur throughout  the whole process—making every step more holistic. In 
particular, authorities boarding a vessel for fishing violations could also possess the 
authority (and ideally the training and resources) to simultaneously investigate for labor 
abuses. However, when developing more holistic and cooperative policies, policy makers 
must be sensitive to the potential of overreach by developed countries when countries of 
varying identities (e.g., economic status) are involved in collaborative negotiations. 
 Furthermore, analyses of potential interventions to reduce forced labor slavery 
and forced labor slavery’s impacts on profit margins suggests that once a vessel, captain, 
or owner is economically driven to use forced labor slavery, and justifies it, they are 
unlikely to stop using forced labor—even if stocks rebound. This is likely due to the 
competitive advantage they have now gained, and the maximized profits the advantage 
yields. To stop using forced labor slavery would reduce their profits. This conclusion is 
supported by the finding in Figure 13 that regulatory problems and challenges—and not 
fish stock declines, fishing effort, or overfishing—was the only variable in the mental 
model scenario that produced substantial decreases in forced labor slavery. In addition, 
when forced labor slavery increased, it generated the largest impacts on profit margins 
(Figure 14) and when forced labor slavery was decreased, it resulted in a decrease in 
profit margins of a -1.5 from the baseline.  
These findings in regards to profit margins imply that fields addressing both the 
ecological and social systems, and their interface, need to shift their approaches from 
reactive to preventive. In order to do this, there must be a greater emphasis on research, 
particularly research that is collaborative, transdisciplinary, and transparent. As such, 
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mutual respect and understanding for different methodological approaches and varying 
definitions of what constitutes empirical data must be built across disciplines. And as 
Bales (2017) noted, human rights experts and NGOs must be willing to publicly share 
their data to build effective collaborations that translate into improved practices, and they 
must be more transparent about their methods and approaches and subject the data to 
critiques and peer-review.  
One potential challenge to this shift from reaction to prevention is that forced 
labor slavery essentially functions as a subsidy in the fishing sector—prolonging the 
industry’s inevitable collapse due to unprofitability. And to date, there has been a lack of 
political will to end traditional financial subsidies in the sector, despite recognition that 
subsidies drive IUU fishing and overfishing. In fact, renegotiating and/or eliminating 
fisheries subsidies first appeared on the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade 
Organization’s agenda in 2001 (Whalén, 2017). However, despite the inclusion of 
eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies by 2020 in Sustainable Development Goal 14 
target six (UN Development Programme, 2018), the Eleventh Ministerial Conference of 
the WTO, held in December 2017, deferred any advancements toward policy-based 
action on the matter again (Whalén, 2017). 
On the other hand, with the recent media attention afforded to labor abuses in the 
fishing sector, numerous working groups (e.g., Conservation International's Social 
Responsibility in Global Fisheries and Aquaculture Program) have formed to ensure not 
only sustainable fisheries, but socially responsible fisheries. Unfortunately, reports from 
labor rights stakeholders and NGOs suggest the human and labor rights fields and their 
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expertise are being excluded from these working groups. In addition, data and evidence 
produced by the human and labor rights fields are often not considered in these working 
groups because the data is obtained through methods that diverge with the biological and 
ecological sciences’ methods and definitions of knowledge. Without the integration of 
this expertise, though, the risk for creating policies and interventions that unintentionally 
exacerbate forced labor slavery remains. 
Because of these transdisciplinary challenges and the historical treatment of these 
two problems as separate issues, there is also likely a role for a discipline to claim 
expertise as the facilitator of the integrating of the differing disciplinary knowledge, 
methodologies, philosophies, and approaches. Social workers, by nature of their training, 
already have expertise in systems thinking and situating persons within environmental 
contexts laden with structural barriers; are trained in both quantitative and qualitative 
research methodologies that recognize inclusive definitions of empirical data; and are 
comfortable bringing together large and diverse groups of people—including 
stakeholders whose voices may have historically been obscured—for a multitude of 
purposes including problem solving, intervention development, policy change, domestic 
and international community development, and advocacy. Despite the calls to action 
noted on page 31, and an obligation based on the profession’s values, social work as a 
whole still has yet to engage in issues of environmental degradation and slavery 
separately, let alone linked. By carving out expertise in this novel transdisciplinary 
facilitation role, social work could avoid “turf wars” with more established disciplines in 
this space with similar areas of expertise and applied research approaches such as human 
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geography and international development. Additionally, it would allow social work 
professionals to center social justice in research and practice approaches, particularly 
since this facet of the profession is unique in comparison to other social sciences 
engaging in this space. 
Study Limitations 
 FCM’s primary limitation is that quantitative analyses are based on connection 
weightings, which each participant subjectively quantifies. While SEM would be the 
more rigorous quantitative methodological approach to test hypotheses about the 
relationship between fish stock declines and human slavery, the research question is not 
yet amenable to quantification for multiple reasons. Foremost, while the researcher 
developed a theoretical framework from an extensive review and amalgamation of 
empirical and theoretical literature, there is a paucity of empirical research validating the 
inclusion and exclusion of pertinent constructs. Additionally, the overall research 
question is not amenable to quantification since longitudinal data is lacking for some 
constructs in the proposed framework. In particular, longitudinal slavery data is almost 
non-existent due to the inaccessibility of the hidden study population and the activity’s 
illegality (IOM, 2008). Time, cost, and safety constraints also hinder researchers’ abilities 
to collect longitudinal slavery data that could be geotagged to sites (i.e., ports) for fish 
stock assessment measures.  
 As a result of FCM’s subjective quantification, non-probability sampling, and the 
small sample size, the findings from the study cannot be interpreted as causality. As 
noted on page 37, the sample also failed to recruit any stakeholders working specifically 
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in South America. And while enrollment in the study was contingent upon having direct 
contact with fishers, only 25% of the sample identified as a former or current fisher, and 
thus had first-hand knowledge of activities at sea. Moreover, though almost 50% of the 
study sample elected to not have their interviews recorded, the lack of recordings did not 
appear to impact the study’s findings since the main unit of analysis was the cognitive 
map created by the participant versus an interview transcript. This conclusion is 
supported by the univariate analyses for interview modality reported in Table 1 on page 
43. 
 Additionally, the numeric values produced by FCM’s case scenario executions to 
describe shifts in a variable from the baseline are difficult to interpret and lack meaning 
outside of comparisons within the study. While they can be compared to other variables 
in the model, they have little practical relevance as they do not represent percentages, 
odds ratios, or other more typical predictive measures produced by statistical analyses.  
 Lastly, while the participants brought longitudinal and historical knowledge into 
their interviews and maps, the study itself employed a cross-sectional design. Without 
multiple interviews with the same stakeholders over a substantial period of time, it is 
difficult to generate conclusions about the previously discussed issue of timescale.  
Conclusion 
 Based on an assessment of the vulnerabilities and risk factors presented in this 
study, it is plausible to conclude that fish stock declines are increasing forced labor 
slavery, and that in turn, forced labor slavery is placing more pressure on fish stocks, 
accelerating their decline. As such, this study’s results point to a compelling need for 
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innovative transdisciplinary research employing the newest technologies to understand 
the strength of the relationship between fish stock declines and forced labor slavery; more 
comprehensive and holistic policies at the international, regional, national, and 
subnational levels; and social-ecological interventions which are assessed for unintended 
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Appendix A: Definitions 
 
Though lacking formal and standardized global definitions, these terms are often 
used to describe the scale and scope of fisheries and the vessels used within them. 





Artisanal Traditional fisheries involving fishing households; can 
be for subsistence or commercial purposes; typically 
small-scale; may not use vessels, but if so, typically 
short-haul 
Characteristic Industrial Fisheries involving enterprises/companies that fish for 
commercial purposes; large scale; can be short or 
long-haul 
 Recreational Harvesting fish for fun or sport 
Purpose Subsistence Harvesting fish for household consumption, fish are 
not sold or traded into informal or formal markets 




Small Small gear and vessel size; fishers typically self-
employed but not always; typically low technology 
and capital, but not always 
 Large Large gear and vessel size; fishers part of an 
employed crew; high technology and capital 
Haul Short Short fishing trips, typically close to shore 





Seiners Vessels that use large nets to harvest fish nearer the 
surface of the water 
Commercial 
Vessels 
Line Vessels Vessels that use fishing lines (instead of nets) with 
baited hooks attached 










My name is Jess Sparks and I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Denver, 
Colorado, USA. For my dissertation research, I am studying forced labor and slavery on 
fishing vessels by interviewing staff affiliated with NGOs working with fishers around 
these issues. I am writing to invite you to participate in the research study. You are 
eligible to participate if you are aged 18 years or older, can participate in an interview 
conducted in English, are affiliated with a NGO registered with a government, and have 
direct contact with fishers.  
 
If you decide to participate in this study you will be asked to share your thoughts about 
forced labor and slavery on fishing vessels, based primarily on knowledge and 
information that fishers have provided to you in your work and your own observations 
and experiences. The interviews will last approximately 90 minutes. 
 
This study is completely voluntary, and you can choose to be in the study or not. If you’d 
like to participate or if you have any questions about the study please email me at 
Jess.Sparks@du.edu. 
 
Also, please feel free to forward this email to others who may be interested in 
participating in the study. 
 


























for a study on Forced Labor and Slavery on Fishing Vessels 
being conducted by researchers at the University of Denver Graduate 




Participants must be: 
 
• Aged 18 years or older,  
 
• Working for a NGO registered with a government,  
 
• Have direct contact with fishers during your work, and 
 
• Able to complete an interview in English 
 
 




For more information contact the principle investigator, Jess Sparks, at:  
 






As a reminder, please use pseudonyms to identify yourself, colleagues, or fishers during 
the interview, and do not name your organization. 
Demographic Questions: 
1) Please provide a pseudonym that we can use throughout the interview to keep 
your identity confidential. 
2) Does your organization primarily focus on anti-slavery and labor abuse issues, 
environmental issues, or both? 
3) What country do you currently work in? 
4) What is your discipline? 
5) Please describe your training and educational background such as your highest 
degree earned and any specialized training you have received for your job. 
6) What is your age? 
7) What race(s) and ethnicity(ies) do you identify with? 
8) How do you identify your gender? 
9) Have you previously worked on a fishing vessel? If yes, please describe your 
primary employment activities. 
10) How long have you worked with fishers around issues of forced labor and 
slavery? 
11) What kind of work have you done/do you do with the fishing community? 
12) Which fishing communities do you primarily interact with?  
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a. Possible prompt if not stated above: Would you describe these 
communities primarily as small-scale, large-scale, or artisanal fisheries?  
b. Possible prompt if not stated above: Where do these communities 
primarily fish at? 
13) Please describe the socio-economic composition of the fishing communities that 
you primarily interact with (e.g., migration status, race/ethnicity/tribe/case, 
religion, education levels)? 
14) How did most of the fishers decide to enter the fishing sector? 
15) Please tell me about the work experiences the fishers have described to you 
(including how long they have worked in the fishing industry, and what activities 
they currently or in the past, have participated in?) 
Migration Questions: 
16) Where do the fishers live? How far are their homes from the landing site? 
17)  Do they live there all year long? If they do not live there all year, where else do 
they live? 
18) Where is their place of birth/origin? 
For individuals reporting that they were not born in the participant’s home 
country or near the home country’s major fishing ports: 
a) When did they begin residing in [insert location]? 
b) How and when did they decide to come to [insert location]? 
c) How did they reach [insert location]? 
d) How did they find work when they first moved to [insert location]? 
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e) What was their occupation prior to leaving their place of origin? 
f) Have they considered returning to their place of origin? 
For individuals reporting that they were born in the participant’s home country 
and near the major fishing ports: 
a) Can you describe any relationships that you are aware of, if any, that migrant 
fishers have with non-migrant fishers in the sector? 
b) What impact has migration had on access to jobs in the fisheries? 
c) Has migration in some way affected the relationships between employers and 
employees in the fisheries sector? 
Cognitive Map Facilitation: 
Explain what we are mapping and why. How researcher will be recording the 
important things that they mention, but can and should correct them! Give a neutral 
example of a map. 
Interviewer will record key variables mentioned in the following with each question 
used as a heading. 
19) Can you tell me about any changes that fishers have noticed in fish stocks? 
If described changes in question 11:  
a) What do fishers think are causing the changes in fish stocks? 
b) What do fishers think could prevent these changes? 
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables generated 
based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do you think these 
things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things that you want to 
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add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the interviewer will ask 
the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then ask the participants, 
“identify two things that you think are related or that affect each other.” When the 
participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how are these things 
related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s direction, probing questions 
may include, “Does one of these things cause the other one? When [insert causal 
variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase or decrease?” An arrow 
pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be drawn. A green arrow will 
indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, so too does the 
other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a negative relationship (meaning that as 
one variable increases, the other decreases). The interviewer will also note a + sign for 
promoting relationships, a – sign for inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing 
relationships. The interviewer will then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship 
is weak/low, medium strength, or strong/high.”  Once the participant assigns a 
qualitative weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that 
corresponds with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant 
describes the relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one tenth) 
from 0.1 to 0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative relationships. 
This process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any further 
relationships. 




c) Are there any other changes that fishers have reported in the fishing sector 
when fish stocks change? 
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables 
generated based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do you 
think these things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things that 
you want to add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the 
interviewer will ask the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then ask 
the participants, “identify two things that you think are related or that affect each other.” 
When the participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how are these 
things related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s direction, probing 
questions may include, “Does one of these things cause the other one? When [insert 
causal variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase or decrease?” An 
arrow pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be drawn. A green arrow 
will indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, so too does 
the other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a negative relationship (meaning that 
as one variable increases, the other decreases). The interviewer will also note a + sign 
for promoting relationships, a – sign for inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing 
relationships. The interviewer will then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship 
is weak/low, medium strength, or strong/high.” Once the participant assigns a qualitative 
weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that corresponds 
with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant describes the 
relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one tenth) from 0.1 to 
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0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative relationships. This 
process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any further relationships. 
The interview then resumes, and the interviewer will continue recording key 
variables. 
20) Have fishers ever described any changes in labor conditions in response to fish 
stock changes? If yes, can you describe these changes in labor conditions? 
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables generated 
based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do you think these 
things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things that you want to 
add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the interviewer will ask 
the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then ask the participants, 
“identify two things that you think are related or that affect each other.” When the 
participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how are these things 
related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s direction, probing questions 
may include, “Does one of these things cause the other one? When [insert causal 
variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase or decrease?” An arrow 
pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be drawn. A green arrow will 
indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, so too does the 
other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a negative relationship (meaning that as 
one variable increases, the other decreases). The interviewer will also note a + sign for 
promoting relationships, a – sign for inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing 
relationships. The interviewer will then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship 
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is weak/low, medium strength, or strong/high.” Once the participant assigns a qualitative 
weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that corresponds 
with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant describes the 
relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one tenth) from 0.1 to 
0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative relationships. This 
process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any further relationships. 
The interview then resumes, and the interviewer will continue recording key 
variables. 
21) How, if at all, have fishers described changes in fishing practices when fish stocks 
change? 
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables generated 
based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do you think these 
things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things that you want to 
add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the interviewer will ask 
the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then ask the participants, 
“identify two things that you think are related or that affect each other.” When the 
participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how are these things 
related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s direction, probing questions 
may include, “Does one of these variables cause the other one? When [insert causal 
variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase or decrease?” An arrow 
pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be drawn. A green arrow will 
indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, so too does the 
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other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a negative relationship (meaning that as 
one variable increases, the other decreases). The interviewer will also note a + sign for 
promoting relationships, a – sign for inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing 
relationships. The interviewer will then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship 
is weak/low, medium strength, or strong/high.” Once the participant assigns a qualitative 
weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that corresponds 
with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant describes the 
relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one tenth) from 0.1 to 
0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative relationships. This 
process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any further relationships. 
The interview then resumes, and the interviewer will continue recording key 
variables. 
22) When I mention fish stocks and labor conditions what comes to mind based on 
your conversations with fishers? 
23) How, if at all, do you think changes in fish stocks affect labor conditions based on 
your interactions with fishers? 
24) What other things come to mind or are important when you think about how fish 
stocks affect labor conditions based on your interactions with fishers? 
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables generated 
based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do you think these 
things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things that you want to 
add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the interviewer will ask 
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the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then ask the participants, 
“identify two things that you think are related or that affect each other.” When the 
participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how are these things 
related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s direction, probing questions 
may include, “Does one of these things cause the other one? When [insert causal 
variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase or decrease?” An arrow 
pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be drawn. A green arrow will 
indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, so too does the 
other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a negative relationship (meaning that as 
one variable increases, the other decreases). The interviewer will also note a + sign for 
promoting relationships, a – sign for inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing 
relationships. The interviewer will then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship 
is weak/low, medium strength, or strong/high.” Once the participant assigns a qualitative 
weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that corresponds 
with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant describes the 
relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one tenth) from 0.1 to 
0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative relationships. This 
process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any further relationships. 
The interview then resumes, and the interviewer will continue recording key 
variables. 
25) How, if at all, do you think changes in labor conditions affect fish stocks based on 
your interactions with fishers? 
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26) What other things come to mind or are important when you think about how labor 
conditions affect fish stocks based on your interactions with fishers? 
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables 
generated based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do 
you think these things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things 
that you want to add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the 
interviewer will ask the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then 
ask the participants, “identify two things that you think are related or that affect each 
other.” When the participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how 
are these things related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s 
direction, probing questions may include, “Does one of these things cause the other 
one? When [insert causal variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase 
or decrease?” An arrow pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be 
drawn. A green arrow will indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one 
variable increases, so too does the other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a 
negative relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, the other decreases). 
The interviewer will also note a + sign for promoting relationships, a – sign for 
inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing relationships. The interviewer will 
then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship is weak/low, 
medium/moderate strength, or strong/high.” Once the participant assigns a 
qualitative weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that 
corresponds with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant 
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describes the relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one 
tenth) from 0.1 to 0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative 
relationships. This process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any 
further relationships. 
The interview then resumes, and the interviewer will continue recording key 
variables. 
27) When I mention fish stocks and labor conditions, does anything else come to 
mind? 
The interviewer will repeat back to the participant the list of key variables generated 
based on the participant’s response. The interviewer will then ask, “Do you think these 
things accurately describe what you just told me? Are there any things that you want to 
add or take away?” Once the list is finalized by the participant, the interviewer will ask 
the participant to define each variable. The interviewer will then ask the participants, 
“identify two things that you think are related or that affect each other.” When the 
participant identifies two variables, the interviewer will ask, “how are these things 
related?” To ascertain fuzzy causality and the relationship’s direction, probing questions 
may include, “Does one of these things cause the other one? When [insert causal 
variable] increases, does [insert outcome variable] increase or decrease?” An arrow 
pointing away from the cause and toward the effect will be drawn. A green arrow will 
indicate a positive relationship (meaning that as one variable increases, so too does the 
other variable), and a red arrow will indicate a negative relationship (meaning that as 
one variable increases, the other decreases). The interviewer will also note a + sign for 
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promoting relationships, a – sign for inhibiting relationships, and a 0 for neutralizing 
relationships. The interviewer will then ask the participant, “do you think the relationship 
is weak/low, medium strength, or strong/high.” Once the participant assigns a qualitative 
weighting, then they will be asked to assign a quantitative weighting that corresponds 
with the qualitative weighting (Table 2). For example, if the participant describes the 
relationship as weak, they will be asked to pick a number (to the one tenth) from 0.1 to 
0.3 for positive relationships and from -0.1 to -0.3 for negative relationships. This 
process is repeated until the participant no longer identifies any further relationships. 
28) Can you tell me about any experiences, if any, that fishers have shared with 
discrimination based on their gender, race, tribe, caste, or immigration or 
migration status in the fisheries sector? 
29) Are there groups of fishers who are more likely to experience discrimination in 












Appendix C: Codebook 
 
Catch-per-unit effort: The number of fish caught per some standardized unit of effort 
(e.g., distance traveled, hours fished, type of gear used). 
 
Consumer demand: The quantity, quality, and price of fish demanded by consumers of 
seafood. 
 
Consumer disconnect: The disconnect between consumers and the seafood they eat, 
including disconnect from where and how the seafood is harvested, processed, and 
imported into their own countries and markets. In developed countries, consumers often 
rely on seafood certification schemes to better educate themselves and make informed 
choices as consumers; however, a recent inundation of these schemes into markets has 
resulted in a lack of transparency and consistency that threatens their quality and their 
ability to appropriately inform consumer choices. 
 
Discrimination: Derived from racism, xenophobia, and nationalism, the unjust, 
inequitable, and systematic biased treatment of groups of persons based on specific 
characteristics and traits.  
 
Disposable vessels: Old, dilapidated vessels that are not equipped with modern 
technology and therefore, when confiscated for illegal activity can easily be abandoned 
without huge financial losses. 
 
Fisheries interventions and regulatory reforms: Strategies for mitigating overfishing. 
 
Fishing effort: Includes distance traveled, number of hours fishing, number of times 
nets/gears cast, depth of fishing, number of crew needed to fish. 
 
Fishing safety: Methods and equipment to protect fishers from danger, risk, or injury 
incurred while fishing. 
 
Fish stock declines: Changes in spatial distribution, size, abundance, and aggregation of 
fish. 
 
Forced labor slavery: “The involuntary entry and holding of people at a workplace 
through force, fraud, or coercion for purposes of forced labor so that the slaveholder can 
extract profit” (Free the Slaves, 2017, para. 1). 
 
Geographic remoteness: Distance of vessel from land and/or inhabited areas. 
 
Global race to fish: Rooted in capitalism, a profit-driven fishing motivation, versus 
tradition, subsistence, etc., that creates extreme global competition for scarce fish 
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resources and that perpetuates more developed countries exploiting less developed 
countries’ territorial waters. 
 
Government inaction: Lack of political will to address large-scale problems spurred by 
corruption, complacency, complicity, and/or collusion.  
 
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing: A classification of fishing activities wherein 
vessels operate in direct violation of binding and non-binding regulatory measures, or 
vessels purposefully exploit regulatory loopholes to evade regulatory measures with 
impunity (e.g., using a flag of convenience).   
 
Increased fishing capacity: Adding more vessels to a fleet than the oceans and/or stocks 
can support.  
 
Labor shortages: Not having enough laborers to meet the demand for crew. 
 
Marginalization of small-scale fishers: When small-scale fishers, including small-scale 
commercial fishers, are forced out of the sector because of a consolidation of power 
and/or wealth in the hands of corporations, or when fishing becomes so expensive only 
corporations can afford it.  
 
Monopolization of resources: Only certain individuals or companies have access to fish 
because of barriers that disproportionately impact vulnerable and/or less powerful groups. 
 
Other transnational crime: Crimes that occur across international borders with wide-scale 
impacts across the greater international community. The distinction as transnational 
suggests these crimes pose greater law enforcement challenges in developing impactful 
strategies. Examples include drug, human, and arms trafficking, people smuggling, etc.  
 
Overfishing: Unsustainable fishing to such an extent that stock depletions exceed 
replacement and recruitment and the stock declines. 
 
Political instability: A government’s inability to support or meet their citizen’s basic 
needs. 
 
Profit margins: The amount of revenue garnered by selling and/or trading fish that 
exceeds the fishing costs. 
 
Regulatory problems and challenges: Harmful barriers to strengthening fishing, labor, 
and human rights standards that are difficult to overcome due to the amount of political 
will and cooperation needed amongst authorities with varying interest and inequitable 
power. Examples include enforcement difficulties, lack of cooperation between entities, 





Social vulnerabilities: The inability of people, organizations, and societies to withstand 
adverse impacts from multiple stressors to which they are exposed. These impacts are 
due, in part, to characteristics inherent in social interactions, institutions, and cultural 
values. Examples include poverty, language barriers, and education disparities. 
 
Subsidies: A sum of money granted by the government to assist an industry or business 
so that the price of a commodity (here fish) or service (fishing) may remain low, 
competitive, or profitable. 
 
Supply chain complexity: The steps that it takes to get seafood from the ocean to a 
consumer’s plate. Complexity comes from the number of steps, number of 
locations/countries/sites, number of regulatory bodies, etc. 
 
Transshipment: When fishing vessels tie up to reefer or mother ships in the middle of the 
ocean to refuel and unload fish catch so that they do not have to come to port for supplies 
or unloading. 
 
Underdeveloped economy: Countries with small economies that struggle to provide 
citizens with basic services (i.e., healthcare, education, etc.). 
 
Use of foreign and migrant workers, often undocumented: Knowingly using available 
migrant and/or foreign workers, or illegally recruiting and smuggling foreign and migrant 
workers into the vessel’s country of origin, to crew a vessel with the explicit intention of 
paying these workers less than available and more skilled domestic crew. 
 
Wildlife crimes: The violation, either purposeful or unintentional, of regulations intended 
to protect and conserve wildlife. Examples include shark finning, the harvesting of sea 
cucumbers, and trafficking of endangered species such as pangolins. 
 
 
 
 
 
